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The Best Interest Is the Child: A Historical 
Philosophy for Modern Issues 
Lahny R. Silva∗ 
Abstract 
A little over a century after the creation of the first juvenile court in 
America, the states and the federal government continue to try to find an 
effective and practical solution to juvenile delinquency. Beginning with the 
“Best Interest of the Child Standard” in 1899, juvenile justice policy has 
evolved into a mixed bag of philosophies. State statutes littered with “Best 
Interest” rhetoric, have interestingly resulted in state policies that are retrib-
utive in nature and disproportionately affect minority communities. The dis-
connect between theory and practice is the product of decades of socio-political 
influence on juvenile justice policy as well as a replacement of the “Best Inter-
est” standard with staunch retributive ideals. This article puts forth a con-
temporary understanding of “Best Interest,” so as to unite theory and practice. 
This union may provide guidance for more effective policies in the realm of 
juvenile justice. 
America faces a costly and overburdened prison industrial complex that is 
fed by the juvenile justice system. Transfer provisions seamlessly transport ju-
venile offenders into adult court for criminal prosecution. Juveniles adjudi-
cated in adult court face harsher penalties and diminished socio-economic op-
portunity than juveniles adjudged in juvenile court. While state lawmakers 
have recently recognized a decrease in violent crime among juveniles overall, 
many have refrained from advocating policies that promote true “Best Inter-
est” ideals and instead have maintained a focus on law and order. Recent sci-
entific research and psychosocial studies along with the past decade of United 
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States Supreme Court precedent suggest that policymakers’ emphasis on ret-
ribution is misguided and anachronistic. Instead, legislators ought to be rec-
ognizing the real differences between juveniles and adults namely the “im-
maturity” of minors as well as their penchant for rehabilitation. This 
principle is already entrenched in other areas of law such as the minor abortion 
line of cases. 
This article advocates for a return to the “Best Interest of the Child” 
standard. Calling for an organic view of “Best Interest where contemporary 
contextual factors may be considered,” this article suggests that “Best Interest” 
calls for a focus on mitigation. This argument builds on Elizabeth S. Scott’s 
and Laurence Steinberg’s mitigation theory of juvenile justice. Scott and 
Steinberg argue that adolescents, because of their biological and psychosocial 
distinctions, possess a diminished capacity and are thereby less criminally 
blameworthy. Therefore, they argue, this diminished capacity ought to be rec-
ognized in the adult prosecution of juveniles. This article argues that Scott 
and Steinberg’s mitigation paradigm implicitly contains Best Interest princi-
ples that may help guide legislators in fashioning legal tools for which to ad-
judicate juvenile offenders in adult court. 
Beginning with a call for a “presumption of immaturity” in transfer de-
cisions, this essay begins to examine practical solutions within a mitigation 
paradigm guided by Best Interest principles. Borrowing from minor abortion 
jurisprudence, it is contended that in those jurisdictions that have established 
automatic transfer provisions there ought to be a “presumption of immatu-
rity” that the state must overcome prior to commencing an adult prosecution 
of a juvenile. Moreover, in the actual adjudication of a juvenile in adult court, 
defenses such as diminished capacity and extreme mental or emotional dis-
turbance (“EMED”) may provide a vehicle for the admissibility of psycholog-
ical and neurological evidence associated with adolescent immaturity and de-
velopment thereby allowing the fact-finder to consider such evidence in its 
determination of criminal blameworthiness. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The “Best Interest of the Child” standard, a theoretical premise 
deeply embedded in American jurisprudence, is in desperate need of 
reframing, particularly in the context of juvenile justice administration. 
While the “Best Interest of the Child” continues to be used by a ma-
jority of juvenile courts across the country, the theoretical underpin-
nings lack coherence and consistency, resulting in many outcomes that 
SILVA.FINAL (UPDATED 6.27) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/28/2014 7:21 AM 
415] The Best Interest Is the Child 
417 
prove contrary to the “Best Interest of the Child.” This results in a 
number of deleterious issues affecting both the individual child and 
community. 
The larger socioeconomic consequences of a disjointed theoretical 
base are problematic not only for America’s youth but also American 
taxpayers. The current juvenile justice system feeds the problem of 
mass incarceration in the United States by channeling a good number 
of youth into adult prison which thereby fuels the perpetuation of a 
“ghetto underclass.” By revisiting and reformulating the “Best Interest 
of the Child” standard in a way that addresses the current system as 
well as the needs of today’s youth, policymakers and jurists alike will 
have guidance in crafting workable and practical solutions to the prob-
lem of juvenile crime in their jurisdictions. 
The discussion of the problem in juvenile justice administration 
begins with cost. First, America spends billions of dollars annually de-
taining and incarcerating youthful offenders. The most recent official 
national study conducted in 2011 placed 60,500 juveniles in residential 
programs or correctional facilities.1 Approximately half of these youth 
are non-violent offenders.2 A disproportionate number are minorities.3 
In addition, there is a substantial loss in opportunity. This loss relates 
not only to individual youth but to the youth’s family and larger com-
munity. This loss can be observed in terms of economic contribution 
to the family, community, and tax base as well as a reduction in the 
overall lifetime earning potential of the individual juvenile. 
Recent scientific research and psychosocial studies, along with the 
past decade of United States Supreme Court precedent, suggest that 
policymakers’ emphasis on retribution is misguided and anachronistic. 
Instead, legislators ought to be recognizing the real differences be-
tween juveniles and adults — namely the “immaturity” of minors as 
well as their penchant for rehabilitation. This principle is already en-
trenched in other areas of law such as the minor abortion line of cases. 
This article advocates for a return to the “Best Interest of the 
Child” standard. Calling for an organic view of Best Interest where 
 
 1.  RICHARD A. MENDEL, THE ANNIE CASEY FOUNDATION, NO PLACE FOR KIDS: 
THE CASE FOR REDUCING JUVENILE INCARCERATION 1 (2011). 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
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contemporary contextual factors may be considered, this article sug-
gests that Best Interest calls for a focus on mitigation. This argument 
builds on Elizabeth S. Scott’s and Laurence Steinberg’s mitigation the-
ory of juvenile justice.4 Scott and Steinberg argue that adolescents, be-
cause of their biological and psychosocial distinctions, possess a dimin-
ished capacity and are thereby less criminally blameworthy.5 
Therefore, they argue, this diminished capacity ought to be recognized 
in the adult prosecution of juveniles.6 This article argues that Scott and 
Steinberg’s mitigation paradigm implicitly contains Best Interest prin-
ciples that may help guide legislators in fashioning legal tools for which 
to adjudicate juvenile offenders in adult court. This article explores 
those possibilities. Beginning with the argument for a “presumption of 
immaturity” in transfer decisions, this essay begins to examine practi-
cal solutions within a mitigation paradigm guided by Best Interest 
principles. Borrowing from minor abortion jurisprudence, it is con-
tended that in those jurisdictions that have established automatic trans-
fer provisions there ought to be a “presumption of immaturity” that 
the state must overcome prior to commencing an adult prosecution of 
a juvenile. Moreover, in the actual adjudication of a juvenile in adult 
court, defenses such as diminished capacity and extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance (“EMED”) may provide a vehicle for the ad-
missibility of psychological and neurological evidence associated with 
adolescent immaturity and development, thereby allowing the fact-
finder to consider such evidence in its determination of criminal 
blameworthiness. 
The first half of this article is descriptive. Part II examines the his-
torical development of juvenile courts, bringing with it the theoretical 
understanding of the “Best Interest of the Child” standard in juvenile 
justice administration. Part III describes the current state of affairs in 
juvenile justice administration. By identifying problems within the sys-
tem, including dilemmas with incarceration, transfer to adult court, 
and the disproportionate impact on minority communities, one may 
 
 4.  Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 799, 838 
(2003). 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
SILVA.FINAL (UPDATED 6.27) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/28/2014 7:21 AM 
415] The Best Interest Is the Child 
419 
contemplate desired outcomes. The second half of the article concen-
trates on reframing the “Best Interest of the Child” standard through 
the mitigation paradigm advanced by Scott and Steinberg. Part IV dis-
cusses mitigation as a portal to preserving Best Interest ideals as well 
as evidence that tends to support the framework. This section includes 
a brief discussion of recent brain science and psychosocial research that 
demonstrates real biological and social differences between minors and 
adults. This section also discusses recent United State Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on the issue of adolescent development. Part V lays out 
presumptions and defenses that may be reconfigured for use in the 
adult prosecution of juveniles. These include the establishment of an 
already recognized principle, the “presumption of immaturity,” as well 
as the traditional defenses of diminished capacity and extreme emo-
tional disturbance. Part VI concludes with a summary of the main 
points as well as thoughts for next steps in the development of an ef-
fective American juvenile justice system where the “Best Interest of the 
Child” returns to center stage. 
II. JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA 
The American colonies conveyed to themselves the powers held by 
the English Crown concerning the welfare of juveniles.7 English com-
mon law bequeathed the right and responsibility of protecting those 
persons incapable of protecting themselves to the Crown.8 The general 
protection of children was bestowed upon the landed aristocracy for 
the purpose of securing profits for the Crown.9 The colonies retained 
this practice but extended these general protections beyond the landed 
aristocracy.10 
Early common law generally treated children under the age of 
seven years old as “incapable of possessing criminal intent.”11 Any child 
 
 7.  See DOUGLAS R. RENDLEMEN, PARENS PATRIAE: FROM CHANCERY TO THE 
JUVENILE COURT, in JUVENILE JUSTICE AND PHILOSOPHY: READINGS, CASES AND 
COMMENT 58, 59–60 (Frederic L. Fraust & Paul J. Brantingham eds., 2d ed. 1979). 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  C. Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and the Bathwater: Adolescent Offending and Punitive 
Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 659, 662 (2005). 
 11.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967). 
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older than seven was treated and punished like an adult offender.12 
While youths over the age of seven could be treated and punished like 
their adult counterparts, they were denied a number of rights granted 
to adult offenders.13 Throughout early American history, children 
were understood to be “legally incompetent.”14 In most criminal mat-
ters, children under the age of seven could assert “infancy” as a defense 
while older children seven to fourteen were subject to a rebuttable pre-
sumption of lack of capacity.15 Youths were subject to adult criminal 
prosecution and if convicted imprisoned in adult facilities.16 With 
courts rarely interfering with familial and educational pursuits, parents 
and schools were permitted to use their choice of disciplinary ap-
proaches to regulate misbehavior.17 
The Industrial Revolution changed the configuration of the family 
structure as well as the role of the family in American society. This 
presented substantial challenges with regard to children and the inter-
action of the state with the modernized family. States were forced to 
deal with wayward children and those youths considered inveterate.18 
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, moralist proponents, 
known as “gentlemen reformers,” created juvenile correctional facili-
ties for youthful offenders.19 The gentlemen reformers were largely 
white Anglo-Saxon Protestants, guided by Enlightenment philosophy 
and determined to eliminate pauperism.20 Such delinquents were 
thought to be “a product of their bad environment and the failure of 
 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at 14. 
 14.  Clarke, supra note10, at 12. 
 15.  Barry C. Feld, Juvenile (In)Justice and the Criminal Court Alternative, 38 CRIME & 
DELINQ. 403, 404 (1993). 
 16.  Gerald F. Glynn, Arkansas’ Missed Opportunity for Rehabilitation: Sending Children to 
Adult Courts, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 77, 80 (1997). 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE 
REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 178–209 (1980); Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the 
Principle of Offense: Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 821–
23 (1988). 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  See generally SANFORD J. FOX, THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE COURT 16–29 (1996). 
SILVA.FINAL (UPDATED 6.27) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/28/2014 7:21 AM 
415] The Best Interest Is the Child 
421 
the family.”21 This ideology was soon to be overshadowed by the Pro-
gressive reformers, a group largely credited with the creation of the 
first juvenile court in 1899.22 
Prior to 1899, early Progressive reformers in Massachusetts, Penn-
sylvania, and New York established Houses of Refuge.23 The purpose 
of these houses was to save children from crime and imprisonment.24 
The focus was on protecting children rather than punishing the youth 
for engaging in criminal behavior.25 Two principal concerns guided 
these reformers: the malleability of children and the idea that the 
child’s environment was the primary cause of delinquent conduct.26 
Delinquency was considered an outgrowth of immorality and pov-
erty.27 With this, Progressive reformers initiated a series of develop-
ments in the administration of young offenders centering on the child 
and the best interest of that child.28 The ideas of the Progressives de-
veloped into the theoretical understanding of the “Best Interest” 
standard that we know today. Justice Fortas described Progressive ide-
ology with regard to child offenders as considering “[w]hat is he, how 
has he become what he is, what had best be done in his interest and in 
the interest of the state to save him from a downward career.”29 It was 
of no consequence to determine the actual “guilt” of the juvenile of-
fender.30 Instead, the focus was on treating the child with the goal of 
assisting in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the child’s life.31 
 
 21.  Feld, supra note 18. 
 22.  FOX, supra note 20, at 29; LEWIS P. TODD & MERLE E. CURTI, RISE OF THE 
AMERICAN NATION 536 (1986). 
 23.  BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE 
COURT 54 (1999); John R. Sutton, Social Structure, Institution, and the Legal Status of Children in 
the United States, 88 AM. J. SOC. 915, 915–19 (1983). 
 24.  Feld, supra note 23. 
 25.  Clarke, supra note 10, at 12. 
 26.  Eric K. Klein, Comment, Dennis the Menace or Billy the Kid: An Analysis of the Role of 
Transfer to Criminal Court in Juvenile Justice, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 371, 376 (1998). 
 27.  Kelly Keimig Elsea, The Juvenile Crime Debate: Rehabilitation, Punishment, or Preven-
tion, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 135, 137 (1995). 
 28.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967). 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  TODD & CURTI, supra note 2222, at 536. 
 31.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15. 
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The Progressive priority was clinical evaluation followed by treatment 
and management of the child.32 
The establishment of the Houses of Refuge brought with it con-
stitutional due process challenges. There was a clear absence of formal 
process in the placement of children in these facilities. Moreover, the 
courts appeared to lack recognized legal authority to do so. In the mid- 
nineteenth century, courts across the country began to face this issue 
head on. In Ex parte Crouse, the father of a teenage girl constitutionally 
challenged her commitment to a Pennsylvania house on the basis of a 
trial by jury violation.33 The basis of the complaint was a violation of 
the trial by jury guarantee.34 In finding the commitment constitutional, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court asserted that such commitment fell 
within the parens patria of the state.35 The objective of the doctrine was 
to rehabilitate and reform children as opposed to punishing the way-
ward youth.36 With this, the court held that due process does not pro-
hibit a state from imposing institutional restraint on a child for the 
child’s welfare.37 The doctrine was again invoked by the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court in 1886.38 In Farnham v. Pierce, the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court permitted the commitment of a child 
without a hearing to make a commitment determination.39 The court 
cited parens patriae as the rationale underlying the state’s power to 
place the child.40 The principle underlying these early American cases 
is the idea that the state may assume control of a child for the purposes 
of protecting the welfare of the child and not for purposes of criminal 
adjudication and punishment.41 These cases stimulated the establish-
ment of a separate juvenile court system with Ex parte Crouse serving 
as the precedential justification for upholding juvenile commitments.42 
 
 32.  Id. at 15–16. 
 33.  Ex parte Crouse, 4 Whart. 9 (Pa. 1839). 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 11. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Farnham v. Pierce, 6 N.E. 830, 831 (Mass. 1886). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Clarke, supra note 10, at 12. 
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 The first officially recognized juvenile court was established in 
Cook County, Illinois in 1899.43  The jurisdictional arm of the court 
applied to children under the age of sixteen years old.44 By the 1940s, 
juvenile court systems were created in all fifty states.45 From the begin-
ning, the principal consideration of the juvenile courts was the welfare 
of the child.46 Juvenile courts utilized indeterminate processes that in-
tegrated principles of psychology and social work in their evaluation of 
children. With this, they developed specific and individualistic treat-
ment plans to meet the child’s needs.47 This required exercising vast 
discretion in order to develop appropriate remedies that would ade-
quately address the child’s issues.48 
In the 1960s, American courts began to systematically develop the 
doctrine of parens patriae understanding that wise adults ought to make 
decisions in the best interest of minor children.49 In the court’s formu-
lation of the “Best Interest,” both the child’s physical and psychosocial 
well-being was paramount.50 Tension existed however, between 
providing children with individual treatment and the inundation of ju-
venile offenders into the juvenile court system.51 The sheer volume of 
cases in juvenile courts began to overburden a juvenile justice system 
that had been in place since the early 1900s.52 With individual treat-
ment no longer a viable option, courts chose between one of two 
 
 43.  ANTHONY M. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 
101–36 (2d ed. 1977). 
 44.  Laureen D’Ambra, A Legal Response to Juvenile Crime: Why Waiver of Juvenile Offenders 
Is Not a Panacea, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 277, 280 (1997). 
 45.  Adam D. Kamenstein, The Inner-Morality of Juvenile Justice: The Case of Consistency and 
Legality, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 2105, 2111 (1997). 
 46.  Marygold S. Melli, Juvenile Justice Reform in Context, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 375, 378 
(1996). 
 47.  Platt, supra note 43, at 43–47. 
 48.  F. FAUST & P. BRANTINGHAM, THE INVENTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT, in 
JUVENILE JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY 550–57 (1974), 
 49.  Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 695 
(1996). 
 50.  Gilbert v. Gilbert, No. 093459, 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 2153 (Aug. 16, 1996). 
 51.  Jennifer O’Connor & Lucinda K. Treat, Note, Getting Smart About Getting Tough: 
Juvenile Justice and the Possibility of Progressive Reform, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1299, 1303 (1996). 
 52.  Id. 
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courses: sending juveniles to correctional facilities or meting out leni-
ent sanctions.53 The rulings of the courts slowly began to abandon in-
dividualized treatment and proportionality in juvenile punishment and 
instead began to resemble adult criminal courts with penal sentences 
justified with parens patriae.54 With the transformation of the juvenile 
court system, the need developed for procedural protections to ensure 
fairness in processes that may potentially have deprived juveniles of 
their freedom. Such processes began to take shape with a number of 
United States Supreme Court cases in the 1960s. Beginning with Kent 
v. United States, the Court set in motion the solidification of juvenile 
court as a criminal court for children by requiring constitutional crim-
inal procedural protections for juveniles, including the right to coun-
sel, the right to confront and cross-examine witness, the privilege 
against self-incrimination, and the right to notice of the charges.55 Ex-
plicitly condemning the doctrine of parens patriae in In re Gault, the 
Court asserted that “unbridled discretion, however benevolently mo-
tivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.”56 
Per the Court, children “receive[d] the worst of both worlds . . . he 
gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care 
and regenerative treatment postulated for children.”57 
Chronologically coinciding with the transformation of the juvenile 
court, America itself experienced a social revolution. The 1960s 
brought with it social movement. The civil rights movement and the 
Vietnam War worked in sync to create a ripe political environment for 
social change. The Great Migration of Black America from the South 
to urban areas changed the socio-political dynamic of American urban 
areas, with the result of white flight and a concentration of many poor 
black Americans in one geographic area.58 The riots in Watts, Detroit, 
and other areas of the country painted a stark picture of black violence 
and called into question black grievances against government that were 
 
 53.  O’Connor & Treat, supra note 51. 
 54.  Id. at 1305–07. 
 55.  Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
 56.  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967). 
 57.  Kent, 383 U.S. at 556. 
 58.  DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 84 (2001). 
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brought to the forefront during the civil rights movement.59 Conserva-
tive legislators seized the opportunity to blame social welfare program-
ming for rising crime rates for which they received substantial electoral 
gains.60 Appealing to white voters’ racial animus, Conservatives pushed 
an agenda calling for personal responsibility and penal policies that 
were tough on crime.61 For Lemann, “the government’s response to 
[black] migration provided the conservative movement with many of 
its issues.”62 This included juvenile courts. 
The 1970s were characterized by both a practical and ideological 
shift. The crime rate of juveniles appeared to explode as the baby boom-
ers reached adolescence.63 The escalation of crime was most apparent 
in the inner cities, which were primarily black areas.64 Liberals and 
conservatives alike endorsed retributive penal polices and determinate 
sentencing schemes.65 Liberals asserted that indeterminate sentencing 
schemes produced egregious racial disparity while conservatives advo-
cated for harsher criminal sentences.66 Tough on crime rhetoric pro-
duced statutes and regulations permitting punitive sentences for juve-
nile offenders.67 These laws underscored the juvenile’s offense while 
de-emphasizing the Best Interest of the Child and parens patriae. With 
this, states began to enact transfer/waiver statutes thereby permitting 
juveniles to be transferred to adult court for criminal prosecution with 
relative ease.68 Today, all fifty states permit some form of transfer.69 At 
 
 59.  Id. at 97. See generally NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT 
BLACK MIGRATION AND HOW IT CHANGED AMERICA (1991). 
 60.  LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 495 (2000). 
 61.  LEMANN, supra note 59, at 200. 
 62. Id. 
 63.  FRANKLIN E. ZIMRIG & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM: 
LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 66 (1997). 
 64.  FRANCIS T. CULLEN & KAREN E. GILBERT, REAFFIMING REAHABILITATION 39–40 
(1982); MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT 94–95 (1995). 
 65.  MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 6–12 (1996); Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile 
Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Legislatives Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 471, 483–87(1987). 
 66.  TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT, supra note 64, at 94–95. 
 67.  THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
COMMISSION 3 (Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996). 
 68.  Hunter Hurst III, Crime Scene: Treating Juveniles as Adults, TRIAL, July 1997, at 34. 
 69.  Kelly M. Angell, Note, The Regressive Movement: When Juvenile Offenders Are Treated 
as Adults, Nobody Wins, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 125, 127 (2004). 
SILVA.FINAL (UPDATED 6.27) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/28/2014 7:21 AM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 28 
426 
a national level, the 1970s ushered in the establishment of the Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act.70 The Act emphasized four 
core purposes to which juvenile justice administration was encouraged 
to focus: deinstitutionalization of status offenders (truants, curfew vio-
lators), separation of juveniles from adults in jail, disallowance of the 
placement of youth in adult facilities, and decrease in minority over-
representation in the juvenile system.71 
The War on Drugs was a catalyst for the enactment of determinate 
sentencing policies and harsh sentences for drug offenders. The intro-
duction of crack cocaine into urban areas in the 1980s birthed an era 
of both devastation and violence in black neighborhoods.72 The drug 
industry produced youths armed for their own protection with the pur-
pose of protecting drug profits.73 Between 1986 and 1993 the juvenile 
murder rate increased 278 percent for black youth while it increased 
forty percent for their white counterparts.74 During the same time pe-
riod, gun homicides quadrupled for juveniles75 and the myth of the 
“Superpredator” was unleashed.76 The media’s portrayal of urban 
black males further exacerbated anxieties calling for harsher punish-
ment for juvenile offenders while simultaneously aggravating an al-
ready existing racial disparity in arrest rates for juvenile crime.77 The 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act enacted in the early 
1970’s was modified to include minimum detention requirements and 
 
 70.  THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION ACT OF 1974, 88 Stat. 
1109 (1974). 
 71.  Id.; Heather Hojnacki, Graham v. Florida: How the Supreme Court’s Rationale Encour-
ages Reform of the Juvenile Justice System through Alternative Dispute Resolution Strategies, 12 PEPP. 
DISP. RESOL. L. J. 135, 137–38 (2012). 
 72.  Philip J. Cook & John H. Laub, The Unprecedented Epidemic in Youth Violence, 25 
CRIME & JUST. 27, 53–54 (1998). 
 73.  Alfred Blumstein, Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry, 86 J. CRIM. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 10, 39 (1995). 
 74.  MELISSA SICKMUND, HOWARD N. SNYDER & EILEEN POE-YAMAGATA, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIM: 1997 UPDATE ON VIOLENCE 13 (1997). 
 75.  Franklin E. Zimring, Kids, Guns, and Homicide: Policy Notes on an Age-Specific Epidemic, 
59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25, 28 (1996). 
 76.  See, e.g., Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 1999 
National Report Series, Juvenile Justice Bulletin: Challenging the Myths 2 (Feb. 2000), 
available at http://www.ojjdp.gov. 
 77.  MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 13 (1999). 
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an escape hatch provision in the statute.78 This provision permitted the 
criminal prosecution of juveniles for weapons and violent offenses.79 
Two decades later, America is experiencing the aftershocks of the 
War on Drugs. The volume of cases in juvenile courts has considerably 
increased “without a corresponding increase in resources.”80 The ef-
fects of these policies have resulted in 60,500 youths in correctional 
facilities or other residential programs.81 Over sixty percent of those in 
custody are male youth of color.82 The United States Department of 
Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
(“OJJDP”) recently reported that in some jurisdictions fifty percent of 
juveniles released from detention are rearrested within three years or 
less of release.83 Legislators have enacted a number of statutes facili-
tating streamlined transfers of juveniles from juvenile court to adult 
court.84 Most notably, state provisions include mechanisms that cir-
cumvent “individualized treatment” and provide categorical offense-
based jurisdictional requirements thereby bypassing the juvenile sys-
tem altogether.85 Despite the significant changes in juvenile justice ad-
ministration, most states have not completely abandoned the rehabili-
tative ideal encapsulated in the Best Interest of the Child paradigm.86 
 Most of the Best Interest principles guiding the Progressive Re-
formers remain important today. First, it is important to recognize that 
minors are distinct from adults. The law has a history of restraining 
the type of activities and freedoms to which juveniles may actively en-
gage based solely on their age. Juveniles are not permitted to enter into 
contracts, vote, enter the armed forces, or buy alcohol. It is a legal in-
 
 78.  Hojnacki, supra note 71, at 139. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Edmund F. McGarrell, Restorative Justice Conferences as an Early Response to Young Of-
fenders, JUV. JUST. BULL. (Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, Wash., D.C.), 
Aug. 2001, at 2, available at http://www.d.umn.edu/~jmaahs/Vita%20and%20pubs/Delin-
quency%20and%20Juvenile%20Justice/restore1.pdf. 
 81.  SICKMUND, ET AL., supra note 74, at 200. 
 82.  Id. at 209. 
 83.  Id. at 234. 
 84.  Mark Soler, Juvenile Justice in the Next Century: Programs or Politics, 10 CRIM. JUST. 
27 (1996). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Craig Hemmens, Eric J. Fritsch & Tory J. Caeti, The Rhetoric of Juvenile Justice Re-
form, 18 QLR 661, 677 (1999). 
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consistency to allow a juvenile to be adjudicated in adult court and sen-
tenced to adult prison, without granting corollary rights to juveniles. 
Second, Best Interest ideals value the malleability of minors. It recog-
nizes that juveniles are in psychosocial and biological transition and 
are therefore capable of changing their behaviors. Finally, Best Interest 
promotes clinical and individualized treatment. It seeks to review in-
stances of juvenile delinquency on a case-by-case basis and create a 
special treatment plan for that specific minor. Best Interest principles 
frown upon juvenile transfer to adult court because in the case of chil-
dren there is still hope for change. While juvenile courts are overbur-
dened with the number of cases on the docket, it is important to rec-
ognize the long-term consequences of ignoring individual juvenile 
issues. 
III. CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 
Transfers to adult court, recidivism, and disparate impact are the 
hallmark of today’s juvenile justice system. The contextual and theo-
retical changes that influenced the transformation of legal and institu-
tional principles have led to a schizophrenic ideological understanding 
of juvenile justice today. To pinpoint one ideological principle that 
represents juvenile justice administration in America today is far from 
an easy task. While the purpose clauses of juvenile codes may give 
scholars and advocates an implicit hint, the codes themselves are com-
prised of a “mixed bag” of theoretical underpinnings that include both 
“Best Interest” and retributive ideals.87 It is from these muddy waters 
that an in-depth assessment of contemporary problems is examined. 
Focusing specifically on transfer, imprisonment, recidivism, and dis-
proportionate impact, this section aims to present a portrait of the cur-
rent state of affairs. 
A. Transfer 
Since its inception, the juvenile justice system in America has sus-
tained statutory and regulatory provisions permitting transfer of 
 
 87.  Linda F. Giardino, Statutory Rhetoric: The Reality Behind Juvenile Justice Policies in 
America, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 223, 231–36 (1996). 
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youths from juvenile court to adult criminal court.88 Transfer was tra-
ditionally reserved for the most extreme juvenile crimes and older 
youth.89 Approximately, 200,000 juveniles are transferred to adult 
court each year.90 Today, transfer provisions capture thousands of ju-
veniles in the form of categorical offense based statutes that mandate 
transfer or through largely unreviewable prosecutorial decisions. Once 
a juvenile is transferred to adult court, most jurisdictions require that 
he be prosecuted in adult court for any future offenses.91 
The current trend in transfer decisions substantially diverges from 
the original theoretical principles of “Best Interest.”92 “Best Interest” 
considerations have virtually disappeared from transfer determinations 
as most “decisions” to transfer are mandatory or statutorily required.93 
Individualized “treatment plans” and clinical evaluations have dissi-
pated. Moreover, the understanding that juveniles are distinct from 
adults and ought to be treated differently seems to have disappeared 
from discussions of transfer altogether. 
1. Methods of transfer 
Juveniles are commonly transferred to adult criminal court in one 
of four ways: judicial waiver, statutory exclusion, prosecutorial trans-
fers, and blended sentence.94 Judicial waiver grants juvenile judges the 
authority to waive jurisdiction and transfer the case to adult court for 
criminal prosecution.95 A number of statutes enumerate factors to be 
taken into consideration by juvenile court judges.96 Most states still 
 
 88.  See Francis Barry McCarthy, The Serious Offender and Juvenile Court Reform: The Case 
for Prosecutorial Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 629, 642–43 (1994). 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Laurence Steinberg, Juveniles on Trial: MacArthur Foundation Study Calls Competency 
into Question, 18 CRIM. JUST. 20, 21 (2003). 
 91.  G. LARRY MAYS & RICK RUDDELL, DO THE CRIME, DO THE TIME: JUVENILE 
CRIMINALS AND ADULT JUSTICE IN THE AMERICAN COURT SYSTEM 10 (2012). 
 92.  Lisa A. Cintron, Comment, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court System: Limiting Juvenile 
Transfers to Adult Court, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1254, 1271 (1995). 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Justice or Vengeance: How Young Is Too Young for A Child to Be Tried And Punished as an 
Adult?, 34 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 159, 168–72 (2002-2003). 
 95.  MELISSA SICKMUND, ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., OFFICE OF JUV. JUST. AND 
DELINQ. PREVENTION: HOW JUVENILES GET TO CRIMINAL COURT, OJJDP UPDATE ON 
STATISTICS BULLETIN (1994). 
 96.  Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 565–68 (1996) (Appendix to Opinion of the 
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permit judges to waive jurisdiction based on an assessment of the 
child’s “amenability to treatment” and/or “dangerousness.”97 With 
this, judges review categorical factors such as the gravity of the offense, 
the circumstances of the offense, prior record, likelihood of rehabilita-
tion, maturity, and home environment.98 Because of the subjectivity of 
the fundamental issues, courts tend to interpret and ultimately apply 
transfer statutes inconsistently.99 
Statutory exclusions or statutory waivers provide no discretion for 
judges or prosecutors in transfer cases.100 Such statutes require transfer 
for certain offenses while others provide an upper age limit for juvenile 
court jurisdiction.101 This is the most utilized form of transfer today; 
with the Department of Justice reporting that 41.6 percent of juvenile 
transfers are achieved using this method.102 
Prosecutorial transfers give prosecutors discretion to file cases in 
either juvenile or adult court.103 This method is known as prosecutorial 
waiver or “direct file.”104 Discretion is non-appealable in some states.105 
This authority, however, is not absolute.106 Prosecutors are generally 
limited by age and specific offenses.107 Nevertheless, without formal 
parameters, the decision to transfer is largely based on subjective con-
siderations such as the area where the defendant resides and the gravity 
of the offense.108 
 
Court). 
 97.  See Barry C. Feld, Violent Youth and Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law 
Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 1006 (1995). 
 98.  Kent, 383 U.S. at 565–68. 
 99.  Feld, supra note 97, at 1010. 
 100.  Catherine R. Guttman, Note, Listen to the Children: The Decision to Transfer Juveniles 
to Adult Court, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 507, 521–22 (1995). 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  GERARD A. RAINVILLE & STEVEN K. SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE 
FELONY DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL COURTS 2 (2003). 
 103.  Barbara J. Valliere, Note, The Transfer of Juvenile Offenders to Adult Courts in Massa-
chusetts: Reevaluating the Rehabilitative Ideal, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 989, 996 (1986). 
 104.  Brian G. Sellers & Bruce Arrigo, Adolescent Transfer, Developmental Maturity, and Ad-
judicative Competence: An Ethical and Justice Policy Inquiry, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 435, 
442 (2009). 
 105.  Valliere, supra note 103. 
 106.  SICKMUND, supra note 95, at 1. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Barry C. Feld, Juvenile Transfer, 3 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 599, 601 (2004). 
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The blended sentence provides overlap between the juvenile sys-
tem and adult court. These sentences involve meting out a juvenile 
punishment with an adult criminal sentence suspended.109 So long as 
the juvenile complies and completes the juvenile sanction, he will not 
be incarcerated. However, if the juvenile fails to comply with the 
court-ordered juvenile sanction, he will receive the adult sentence. 
2. The courts and application 
In the 1960’s and 1970’s the most common transfer strategy was 
judicial waiver. With this method, juvenile court judges used their dis-
cretion to determine whether transfer to adult court was warranted af-
ter a hearing was held. During the hearing, the court examined evi-
dence concerning a youth’s amenability to treatment and any potential 
threats the juvenile posed to society. A decision to transfer to adult 
court was primarily based on the juvenile’s criminal history and the 
seriousness of the crime.110 
 a. Kent v. United States. The United States Supreme Court re-
viewed judicial transfer in the 1966 decision in Kent v. United States.111 
In Kent, petitioner Kent was alleged to have committed a number of 
crimes between the ages of fourteen and sixteen including breaking 
and entering, robbery, and rape in the District of Colombia.112 He was 
apprehended for the rape and robbery upon which he admitted his in-
volvement in the current offense.113 He also volunteered information 
concerning similar offenses.114 Kent was sixteen at the time, which 
placed him within the “exclusive jurisdiction” of the D.C. Juvenile 
Court.115 However, the D.C. statute provided that the district court 
judge could waive jurisdiction after a “full investigation.”116 In Kent’s 
 
 109.  MAYS & RUDDELL, supra note 91. 
 110.  Sellers & Arrigo, supra note 104. 
 111.  Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
 112.  Id. at 543. Kent was fourteen years old when he was accused of breaking and entering 
into several homes as well as purse snatching. This precipitated his entry into the juvenile court 
system. He was placed on probation. Two years later, he was charged with rape, breaking and 
entering, and robbery. He was sixteen years old. 
 113.  Id. at 544. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 543. 
 116.  Id. at 547. 
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case, the district court judge waived juvenile court jurisdiction.117 The 
district court did not hold a hearing, nor did the judge rule on peti-
tioner’s motion on the issue of waiver.118 On appeal to the United 
States Supreme Court, Kent attacked the waiver on Due Process 
grounds. He claimed that that the waiver was defective because no 
hearing was held and the Juvenile Court judge made no explicit state-
ments for the determination.119 The United States Supreme Court 
agreed.120 
In an opinion written by Justice Fortas, the Court concluded that 
the D.C. Juvenile Court Act did not permit a juvenile court judge to 
decide on its own accord, without any participation from the child or 
the child’s representative, the “critically important” issue of waiver.121 
For the Court, “there is no place in our system of law for reaching a 
result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony—without 
hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of 
reasons.”122 In discussing the primary function of the Juvenile Court, 
the Court asserted that Juvenile Court is parens patriae as opposed to a 
prosecutor or judge.123 Juvenile courts are to decide the needs of a child 
as opposed to criminally prosecute.124 Because of this theoretical func-
tion, courts have determined that juvenile court proceedings are “civil” 
as opposed to “criminal” in nature and have prohibited later com-
plaints from juveniles regarding a deprivation of rights.125 However, it 
was well established that a juvenile can claim a deprivation of due pro-
cess.126 With this, the Supreme Court did two important things. First, 
it established that the decision to transfer a juvenile is a “critically im-
portant” proceeding.127 For the Court, “an opportunity for a hearing 
which may be informal, must be given the child prior to entry of a 
 
 117.  Id. at 546. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 552. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. at 553. 
 122.  Id. at 554. 
 123.  Id. at 554–55. 
 124.  Id. at 554. 
 125.  Id. at 555. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 560. 
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waiver order.”128 The Court also required the Juvenile Court to ac-
company its waiver order with a statement of reasons or considera-
tions.129 Such a statement may not be an assumption or boilerplate 
mimicking the statutory language. At the very least, the statement 
should include relevant facts so as to provide a factual basis for the 
waiver determination.130 The Kent decision set a minimum standard of 
due process in juvenile court waiver proceedings. At the very least, a 
juvenile is entitled to a hearing and representation of counsel.131 To-
day, Kent is being circumvented by automatic transfer statutes and di-
rect files methods. While Kent requires protections in the context of 
judicial waiver, it does not speak to legislative directives or prosecuto-
rial discretion. States appear to understand Kent as a judicial waiver 
case only. However, Kent may be understood as applicable to juvenile 
transfer generally. Nevertheless, that argument is not an issue cur-
rently before the Court. 
 b. Lower Courts. Wyoming vests jurisdiction over minors charged 
with violent felonies in both district and juvenile courts.132 In evaluat-
ing transfer cases, courts are required to consider evidence pertaining 
to statutory factors.133 These factors include the seriousness of the al-
leged offense and the protection of the community, whether the al-
leged offense was committed with premeditation and violence, 
whether the alleged offense was against persons, previous history of 
the juvenile, and the maturity of the juvenile.134 Maturity is to be “de-
termined by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emo-
tional attitude, and pattern of living.”135 Wyoming places the burden 
of production on the minor requiring him to prove by the preponder-
ance of the evidence that the case ought to be transferred to the juve-
nile court.136 The State, however, maintains the burden of persuading 
 
 128.  Id. at 561. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  Id. 
 132.  WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-203(f)(iv) (2013). 
 133.  WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-237(b)(i)–(vii). 
 134. Id. 
 135.  WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-237(b)(v). 
 136.  JB v. State, 305 P.3d 1137, 1139 (Wyo. 2013). 
SILVA.FINAL (UPDATED 6.27) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/28/2014 7:21 AM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 28 
434 
the court that adult court ought to maintain jurisdiction over the mi-
nor.137 
The federal statute governing juvenile transfer is established in the 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act.138 While the federal 
system has not established specifically-enumerated juvenile offenses, 
juveniles may be charged with criminal offenses and prosecuted in 
adult court. The Act established a number of procedures and required 
proceedings governing juvenile transfer in the federal jurisdictions. 
These proceedings have been characterized as “civil” in nature with 
the government bearing the burden of proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence the need for transfer.139 In order to make its determina-
tion, the federal courts must consider evidence pertinent to factors 
outlined in § 5032.140 These factors include: 
[T]he age and social background of the juvenile; the nature of the 
alleged offense; the extent and nature of the juvenile’s prior delin-
quency record; the extent and nature of the of the juvenile’s present 
intellectual development and psychological maturity; the nature of 
past treatment efforts and the juvenile’s response to such efforts; the 
availability of programs designed to treat the juvenile’s behavioral 
problems.141 
The court is not required to examine the accuracy of the allega-
tions against the juvenile and may assume that a juvenile has in fact 
committed the offense.142 The court may order transfer if it finds that 
it “would be in the interest of justice by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.”143 
While judicial waiver was the common mode of transfer, today it 
is the least utilized. With statutory exclusion and direct file methods, 
the number of juveniles adjudicated in adult court increased seventy-
 
 137.  Id. at 1141. 
 138.  18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2012). 
 139.  United States v. A.R., 38 F.3d 699, 703 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Juvenile Male 
#1, 86 F.3d 1314, 1322–23 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. T.F.F., 55 F.3d 1118, 1122 (6th Cir. 
1995); United States v. Parker, 956 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 140.  18 U.S.C. § 5032 (2012). 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  United States v. Juvenile, 451 F.3d 571, 576 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 143.  United States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 858 (4th Cir. 2005). 
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three percent from 1986 to 1994.144 This path leads to a number of 
problems including high rates of criminal recidivism and dispropor-
tionate impact on minority communities and children with disabilities. 
3. Problems with transfer 
A number of issues have surfaced as a result of the frequency of 
transfer. First, the majority of juveniles transferred to adult court are 
first time and nonviolent offenders.145 Violent juvenile offenders in-
cluding those convicted of murder and rape comprise less than 0.5 per-
cent of the juvenile offending population.146 This category of juvenile 
offenders was the originally intended target of transfer mechanisms as 
opposed to nonviolent juveniles.147 Legislatures anticipated transfer 
provisions to apply to serious violent offenders and recidivists.148 How-
ever, many of the cases transferred from juvenile court to adult crimi-
nal court consist of property and drug crimes.149 Transferring non-vi-
olent youth will continue to clog an already overburdened adult 
criminal court docket. 
The Juvenile Justice Standards Project of the Institute of Judicial 
Administration in collaboration with the American Bar Association 
(“IJA-ABA”) produced a set of model rules and standards governing 
juvenile justice administration.150 On the issue of transfer, the IJA-ABA 
rules encourage a determination by the juvenile court that a juvenile is 
“not a proper person to be handled by the juvenile court.”151 The 
standards set out a number of factors meant to guide the court in its 
evaluation. The factors include the seriousness of the alleged offense, 
 
 144.  Dana Royce Baerger et al., Competency to Stand Trial in Preadjucated and Petitioned Ju-
venile Defendants, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 314, 314 (2003). 
 145.  See DEAN J. CHAMPION & G. LARRY MAYS, TRANSFERRING JUVENILES TO 
CRIMINAL COURTS: TRENDS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 77 (1991). 
 146.  MICHAEL A. JONES & BARRY KRISBERG, IMAGES AND REALITY: JUVENILE CRIME, 
YOUTH VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 10 (1994). 
 147.  CHAMPION & MAYS, supra note 145, at 79. 
 148.  Id. at 74. 
 149.  See Eric Fritsch & Craig Hemmens, Juvenile Waiver in the United States 1979-1995: 
A Comparison and Analysis of State Waiver Statutes, 46 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 17, 18 (1995). 
 150. IJA-ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS ANNOTATED: A BALANCED APPROACH 
(Robert E. Shepherd, Jr. ed., 1996). 
 151.  Charles Whitebread, Standards Relating to Transfer Between Courts, in IJA-ABA 
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS ANNOTATED: A BALANCED APPROACH supra note 150, at 288. 
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criminal history involving violence; the inefficacy of available disposi-
tions; and dispositional alternatives available in the criminal justice sys-
tem.152 The court’s determination must be supported by clear and con-
vincing evidence on all of these factors.153 The standards encourage 
that juveniles be given the opportunity to contest waiver by producing 
evidence that challenges the state’s evidence on the matter.154 
In addition to the frequency of transfer, adult court does not typi-
cally have the resources to “treat” juvenile offenders.155 Aimed at pun-
ishment, adult court does not provide juvenile offenders with treat-
ment and services that contemplate adolescent development and 
amenability to rehabilitation. 
Transferring juveniles to adult court also significantly impacts the 
life of the individual juvenile. A felony conviction substantially impairs 
life prospects for all offenders. The stigma that attaches to “felon” sta-
tus affects both civil liberties and the economic earning capacity of the 
juvenile.156 The cost to the American taxpayer is unquantifiable and is 
primarily felt on two fronts. First, national and state economies suffer 
with oppressive expenditures on corrections. In 2007, the federal gov-
ernment spent $228 billion dollars on justice administration.157While 
juvenile justice administration may comprise a smaller percentage of 
total spending, it substantially contributes to adult corrections expend-
itures with approximately thirty-five to fifty percent of adult offenders 
having juvenile histories.158 These numbers suggest that the current 
juvenile system is not functioning so as to divert the juvenile offender 
away from adult criminality. Instead, it is feeding it. 
Shouldering this financial burden is the American taxpayer, who is 
also losing in the form of squandered social capital and untapped tal-
ent. Youth sentenced to detention and imprisonment have less socio-
 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. at 290. 
 155.  CHAMPION & MAYS, supra note 145, at 74–75. 
 156.  Lahny R. Silva, Clean Slate: Expanding Expungements and Pardons for Non-violent Fed-
eral Offenders, 79 CINN. L. REV. 155, 165–66 (2011). 
 157. TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, JUSTICE EXPENDITURES AND EMPLOYMENT 1982–2007 
STATISTICAL TABLES, NCJ 236218, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Dec. 2011). 
 158.  Id. 
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economic prospects over a lifetime. In general, newly released offend-
ers face high levels of unemployment as well as below-average wages.159 
On average, incarceration reduces wages by at least eleven percent, 
cuts yearly employment by nine weeks, and reduces annual earnings by 
at least forty percent.160 When years of work experience are statistically 
controlled, the results change very little.161 
The predominance of transfer today speaks to the success (or fail-
ure) of the juvenile justice system. In a system where a juvenile may 
not be a party to a contract, lawfully work and travel, vote, buy alcohol 
or cigarettes, or even attend an adult motion picture, it seems rather 
counterintuitive that the same system would permit minors to be pros-
ecuted in adult court.162 Scholars continually question whether juvenile 
justice administration may be considered successful in light of the fact 
that many juveniles, particularly non-violent, are transferred to adult 
court to face retributive sanctions. The current system is in effect fun-
neling youth into jail and ultimately results in “felon” status. 
B. Incarceration 
Approximately 250,000 juveniles are prosecuted and incarcerated 
as adults annually.163 While juvenile detention itself is fraught with 
physical and sexual violence, those juveniles transferred and adjudi-
cated in adult court face more severe challenges. Juveniles incarcerated 
in adult facilities are more likely to be sexually abused and face physical 
violence. This in turn has damaging effects on the individual’s psycho-
social development. 
Juvenile offenders transferred to adult court are traditionally sen-
tenced to one of three types of imprisonment: segregated incarcera-
tion, graduated incarceration, or adult incarceration.164 Segregated in-
carceration separates juvenile and younger offenders from adult 
 
 159. BRUCE WESTERN & BECKY PETIT, COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S 
EFFECT ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY 11 (The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2010). 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2403–04 (2011). 
 163.  Elizabeth Cate, Teach Your Children Well: Proposed Challenges to the Inadequacies of Cor-
rectional Special Education for Juvenile Inmates, 34 N.Y.U REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 5 (2010). 
 164.  Bree Langemo, Serious Consequences for Serious Juvenile Offenders: Do Juveniles Belong 
in Adult Court?, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 141, 154 (2004). 
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offenders. This separation is maintained until the expiration of the 
youthful offender’s sentence even if the juvenile reaches the age of ma-
turity.165 In the graduated incarceration system, the juvenile is detained 
in a juvenile facility until the individual reaches the age of majority 
where he or she is subsequently placed in an adult facility.166 In the 
adult incarceration system, a juvenile that is sentenced as an adult is 
sent to adult prison.167 
Youth sentenced to adult prison during a developmental era in the 
adolescents’ life when they are pursing social identity, independence, 
and societal associations will face damaging consequences to the over-
all health of the individual.168 Normal adolescent development occurs 
within small social networks such a family, school peers, and neighbor-
hoods.169  
Thus, juvenile offenders sentenced to adult prison will be social-
ized in prison. Professor Fagan argues that in these circumstances two 
consequences are likely to occur: “attenuated development of norma-
tive developmental skills and states, or skewed development of skills 
and states that reflect the contingencies and norms of the adult correc-
tional context.”170 Either way, adolescent development will be dis-
torted by the violent socialization experienced in adult prison facili-
ties.171 
Juvenile offenders placed in adult institutions face a higher risk of 
violence than those that are placed in juvenile facilities. “Juveniles in 
adult institutions are five times more likely to be sexually assaulted, 
twice as likely to be beaten by staff, and fifty percent more likely to be 
attacked with a weapon than minors in juvenile facilities.”172 In addi-
 
 165.  Id. See also NEV. DEP’T OF CORR., ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION 502 (Oct. 14, 
2013). 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  Id. See also BARRY C. FELD, JUVENILE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 179, 222 (Thom-
son West, 2003). 
 168.  Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psy-
chosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 249, 268 (1996). 
 169.  Jeffrey Fagan, This Will Hurt Me More Than It Hurts You: Social and Legal Consequences 
of Criminalizing Delinquency, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 1, 32 (2002). 
 170. Id. at 34. 
 171. Id. at 35. 
 172.  Lisa S. Beresford, Is Lowering the Age at Which Juveniles Can Be Transferred to Adult 
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tion, adult correctional facilities are inadequately equipped with treat-
ment and programming appropriate for servicing youth.173 Poor voca-
tional and educational training serve to weaken opportunities of socio-
economic mobility while prison culture tends to encourage violence as 
a problem-solving and status-building technique.174 Juveniles will 
therefore re-enter society with rather large developmental deficits as 
well as weakened social ties to the offender’s community.175 
C. Recidivism 
A number of studies have determined that transfer to adult court 
actually increases the rate of recidivism for juvenile offenders.176 More-
over, those juveniles sentenced to adult prison also have higher rates 
of recidivism.177 Those punished as adults are three times more likely 
to recidivate than those retained in the juvenile system.178 
A research study conducted in Minneapolis, Minnesota from 
1986–1992 reported that fifty-eight percent of youths transferred to 
adult court committed a new offense(s) within two years of conviction 
while forty-two percent of youths retained in juvenile court recidi-
vated.179  
A Florida study showed similar results with the recidivism rates 
within three years of conviction at thirty percent for transferred youth 
compared to nineteen percent in juvenile court.180 
A study that compared the recidivism rate for juvenile robbery of-
fenders reported that those transferred to adult court consistently had 
 
Criminal Court the Answer to Juvenile Crime? A State-by-State Assessment, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
783, 821–22 (2000); see also Jarod K. Hofacket, Justice or Vengeance: How Young Is Too Young for a 
Child to Be Tried and Punished as an Adult?, 34 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 159, 173 (2003). 
 173.  Fagan, supra note 169, at 33. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  For discussions of these studies, see Angell, supra note 69, at 140 ; Fagan, supra note 
169, at 24–28; Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal System, in CRIME AND 
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 81–167 (Michael Tonry ed., 2000); Beresford, supra note 172, 
at 822. 
 177.  Donna M. Bishop & Charles E. Frazier, Race Effects in Juvenile Justice Decision-Making: 
Findings of a Statewide Analysis, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 392 (2000). 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Fagan, supra note 169, at 24. 
 180.  Id. at 25. 
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a higher recidivism rate than those kept in juvenile court.181 The study 
also reported that the re-arrest rate for juveniles incarcerated in adult 
prison was twenty-five percent higher than those detained in a juvenile 
facility.182  
A Florida study, using data from between 1985 and 1987, com-
pared youth who were transferred to adult court to those youth pro-
cessed in juvenile court.183 In this study, researchers paired offenders 
based on specific characteristics including age, race, gender, type of 
offense, criminal history, etc.184 The study conducted two separate as-
sessments.185 The study reported that transfer to adult court increased 
recidivism in all seven offenses used in the study.186 
D. Disproportionate Impact 
1. Minority children 
From the early nineteenth century to the present, juvenile justice 
has systematically singled out poor children for punishment while their 
middle and upper class counterparts were given more lenient treat-
ment. The current overrepresentation of poor black children in the 
juvenile justice system is an extension of this tradition. A comprehen-
sive analysis regarding racial disproportionality requires an examina-
tion of law enforcement and juvenile justice system policies and prac-
tices that is beyond the scope of this article. For purposes of the present 
research issues, statistics will inform the analysis. 
Black juvenile offenders are more likely to be waived and processed 
in criminal court.187 Black youth comprise thirty-seven percent of 
 
 181. Id. at 27. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Donna M. Bishop et al., The Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court: Does it Make a 
Difference?, 42 CRIME & DELINQ. 171, 175 (1996). 
 184. Id. at 176–77. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 183. 
 187. Kristi Holsinger, Youth in the Juvenile Justice System: Characteristics and Patterns of In-
volvement, in JUVENILE JUSTICE: ADVANCING RESEARCH, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 24, 37 
(Francine T. Sherman & Francine H. Jacobs eds., 2011). 
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transfer decisions while fifty-nine percent of white youth are trans-
ferred to criminal court.188 Latino youth are also disproportionately 
represented in transfer decisions. However, accurate data on this de-
mographic is difficult to ascertain due to “shortcomings in available 
data.”189 
In 2003, there were more than 59,000 minority offenders in juve-
nile facilities across the country comprising sixty-one percent of those 
in detention.190 Black youths specifically accounted for thirty-eight 
percent of all offenders. Currently, black juveniles have the highest 
proportionate rate of detention among racial groups. The Justice De-
partment reports that for every 100,000 black juveniles living in the 
U.S., 754 were detained in a juvenile facility in 2003 as compared to 
the detention rate of 348 for Hispanics and 190 for whites.191 In every 
state except Vermont, the custody rate for black juvenile offenders ex-
ceeds the rate for whites.192 Nationally, the ratio of the custody rate for 
minorities to that of whites was 2.6 to 1.193 This trend can also been 
seen across the states. For example, minority youth between the ages 
of ten and seventeen represent less than twenty-five percent of the 
Florida population but comprise fifty-five percent of the juvenile trans-
fers to adult court.194 
The disproportionate impact of transfer on minority offenders fol-
lows that group throughout the processes associated with the admin-
istration of justice. Minority juveniles were more likely than white ju-
veniles to be in facilities with locked doors or gates.195 Among 
minorities, Hispanic youth were more likely to be held under locked 
arrangements than were other minorities.196 “Minority offenders in 
California are more likely than white offenders to receive harsher sen-
tences for equivalent offenses.”197 
 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. 
 190. Sickmund, Snyder & Poe-Yamagata, supra note 74, at 209. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 213. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Angell, supra note 69. 
 195. Sickmund, Snyder & Poe-Yamagata, supra note 74, at 209. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Angell, supra note 69, at 141–42. 
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Furthermore, the disproportionate number of minority juvenile 
offenders processed through the juvenile justice system means an un-
balanced number of minority men living with the collateral conse-
quences associated with “felon” status. This translates into lifetime op-
portunity loss for the offender in the areas of employment, education, 
civil liberties, and government benefits. 
2. Children with disabilities 
Minorities are not the only demographic with disproportionate 
representation. Children with special education needs are also dispro-
portionately represented. One judge in Nevada commented, 
More and more minors are getting involved in the juvenile justice 
system because they have mental-health needs that are not being 
treated. They are acting out; they are committing offenses because 
they have mental-health problems that need to be addressed. Alt-
hough we certainly get some violent crimes and drug problems, the 
main things we are seeing are cases where families are in desperate 
need of help for kids who have mental-health problems.198 
Youth with mental disabilities represent nine percent of the juvenile 
population but generally represent thirty-six percent of juvenile of-
fenders.199 Other studies report that eighty-five percent of juveniles 
currently in correctional facilities need mental health treatment.200 
While the early implementation of Progressive ideals may not be 
adequate in addressing today’s concerns, there are important and val-
uable principles that may be taken from the overall theoretical basis of 
the Progressive movement itself and interposed in the current dialogue 
concerning juvenile justice administration. The principle that children 
are amenable to reform as well as the idea that the “Best Interest of the 
Child” ought to guide determinations in transfer decisions are norma-
tive ideals that are worth preserving. 
 
 198. Richard D. Williamson, Tracking Trends in Juvenile Justice, 16 NEV. LAW. 20, 20 
(2008) (quoting Judge Schmuck). 
 199. Cate, supra note 163, at 10. 
 200. Kristina Menzel, The School-to-Prison Pipeline: How Schools are Failing to Properly Identify 
and Service Their Education Students and How One Probation Department Has Responded to the Crisis, 
15.3 LOY. PUB. INT. L. REP. 198, 200 (2010). 
SILVA.FINAL (UPDATED 6.27) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/28/2014 7:21 AM 
415] The Best Interest Is the Child 
443 
IV. Mitigations as the Portal 
In the new millennium, scholars and researchers possess over a 
century of jurisprudence as well as empirical and scientific data that 
allow for the formulation of a theoretical framework that can help 
guide legislatures in fashioning an appropriate and workable juvenile 
justice system. Elizabeth Scott and Laurence Steinberg have developed 
a theoretical model espousing mitigation-based principles in the as-
sessment of juvenile crime.201 Their mitigation model of juvenile jus-
tice implicitly recognizes “Best Interest” ideals. Their model, backed 
by recent psychosocial research and United States Supreme Court 
precedent, focuses on the differences in criminal culpability and 
blameworthiness between juveniles and adults.202 Because of the psy-
chological and biological evidence affirmatively showing real differ-
ences in decision-making capabilities between adolescents and adults, 
the law should recognize these differences in meting out punishment. 
The United State Supreme Court has identified and adopted such dis-
tinctions in its assessment of the constitutionality of the death penalty 
and later in the administration of life imprisonment without the possi-
bility of parole in non-homicidal criminal cases for juveniles. The 
recognition and consideration of the mitigating aspects of youth sug-
gest that this framework is a natural and logical extension of juvenile 
justice jurisprudence. 
A. The Paradigm of Mitigation 
Scott and Steinberg’s groundbreaking article, Blaming Youth,203 de-
velops a, theoretical framework for thinking about justice policy and 
“the empirical reality of adolescence.”204 They have developed a miti-
gation based model of juvenile justice premised on proportionality and 
diminished capacity.205 Weighing heavily on the adolescent develop-
mental factors discussed below, they argue that these developmental 
 
 201. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 4, at 838. 
 202. Id. 
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 204. Id. at 839. 
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influences “undermine decision-making capacity in ways that are ac-
cepted as mitigating culpability.”206 The underlying premises of their 
model include: 1) psychosocial immaturity of juveniles and scientific 
evidence demonstrating biological distinctions between juveniles and 
adults and 2) mitigation of criminal culpability in criminal law.207 
These differences, while significant, do not absolutely excuse an ado-
lescent’s criminal conduct.208 Instead, they argue, distinctions ought to 
be treated as mitigation in criminal punishment requiring proportion-
ality in accordance with this diminished blameworthiness reflected in 
the overall sentence.209 
This paradigm recognizes an important “Best Interests” ideal: 
youths are capable of change. With regard to impulsivity and mood 
control, Scott and Steinberg discuss the notion that adolescents may 
have more trouble controlling impulses and moods than adults.210 In 
accordance with this proposition, they cite research reporting that im-
pulsivity eventually declines during early adulthood.211 Explicit recog-
nition of the fact that most youthful offenders do not develop into 
adult criminals provides strong support for their overall thesis that be-
cause juveniles are immature, they possess a diminished criminal cul-
pability that ought to serve as a basis for mitigation in punishment. In 
implementing a mitigation based approach to juvenile justice, Scott 
and Steinberg consider the same psychosocial factors as the United 
States Supreme Court. The framework comports with the most cur-
rent understandings of adolescent development and implicitly pro-
motes “Best Interests” considerations. On a structural level, Scott and 
Steinberg consider application primarily in the context of punishment 
and explore the potential for its use in other circumstances in the adult 
prosecution of juveniles.212 They consider a more individualized con-
 
 206. Id. at 830. 
 207. Id. at 829–32. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 816. 
 211. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 4 (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, 
Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decisionmaking, 20 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 249, 260 (1996)). 
 212. Id. at 837–38. 
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sideration of mitigation based on immaturity but dismiss such a pre-
sumption as an “error-prone undertaking, with the outcomes deter-
mined by factors other than immaturity.”213 While maybe not a work-
able presumption in the context of punishment, a presumption of 
immaturity may work before the adult prosecution of a juvenile even 
begins: transfer. 
B. The Sciences 
Recent advances in neuroscience as well psychology have informed 
scholars, courts, and policymakers in the mental capabilities of juve-
niles. Mounting physiological and biological research suggests that ju-
veniles are biologically different from adults. Recent neuro-scientific 
research in the brain development of pre-teens and teenagers demon-
strate that there are real and substantial distinctions in the capacities 
between juveniles and adults that are related to the determination of 
criminal culpability. Such date has been used as the primary reasoning 
underlying recent United State Supreme Court decisions treating ju-
veniles different than adults in criminal investigation and prosecution. 
With these developments in science and law comes the responsibility 
of lawmakers to examine the data and fashion juvenile justice policy 
accordingly. 
Criminal culpability requires the determination of responsibility 
for a willful act. Responsibility in turn requires the capacity to be ac-
countable for one’s deliberate actions. The ability to generate actions 
that are willful and planned requires psychological abilities that are 
supported by the complex brain mechanisms discussed below. These 
physiological mechanisms are related to “[e]xecutive function and cog-
nitive control are terms used in psychology and neuroscience to de-
scribe the ability to generate actions that are voluntary and goal-di-
rected.”214 These functions include self-monitoring and “inhibition of 
distracting impulses.”215 Immature executive function and decreased 
cognitive control substantially inhibit a juvenile’s ability to adequately 
assess circumstances in which responsibility and consequences are 
 
 213.  Id. at 837. 
 214.  Beatriz Luna, Relevance of Immaturities in the Juvenile Brain from Culpability and Reha-
bilitation, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1469, 1471 (2012). 
 215.  Id. 
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given the requisite consideration for purposes of criminal prosecu-
tion.216 
A recent article in the Hastings Law Journal discusses this very 
phenomenon.217 The article asserts that although the basic ability to 
voluntarily inhibit responses is available at infancy, the ability to gen-
erate correct inhibitory responses” is the measure to which adult cog-
nitive control is evaluated.218 In the best case scenario, “adult level cog-
nitive control is evident by fifteen years of age.”219 An MRI scanner has 
demonstrated that: 
[W]here anxiety increases, performance deteriorates compared to 
adults, suggesting that while they have access to adult level inhibitory 
control, it is still immature and susceptible to errors. Given known 
increased reactivity to socioemotional stimuli, this could undermine 
the ability to apply inhibitory control.220 
The frontal lobes are the area of the brain that is associated with 
the development of critical judgment and learning.221 A reduction of 
blood flow to this area of the brain, a condition known as hypofrontal-
ity, is known to be present in post-traumatic stress disorder, bi-polar 
disorder, and depression.222 Normal adolescents show a mild form of 
hypofrontality.223 Testing demonstrates mild decreases in frontal lobe 
function.224 When this is coupled with increased levels of sex hormones 
associated with puberty the result can be hyperresponsiveness to stim-
uli.225 
It has also recently been discovered that the maturation in the part 
of the brain responsible for making sound judgments and calming dis-
ruptive emotions, the systems in the ventromedial and dorsolateral re-
gions of the prefrontal cortex, occur later in adolescent development 
 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Id. at 1472. 
 218.  Id. at 1472–73. 
 219.  Id. at 1473. 
 220.  Id. 
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 222.  Id. 
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than previously thought.226 It is now believed that the ultimate stage of 
development in this area of the brain actually occurs in an individual’s 
twenties.227 These areas of the brain are associated with self-control, 
inhibiting impulsive action, social judgment, and cost-benefit analyses 
in decision-making situations.228 Research has also demonstrated that 
completion of the physiological development of the brain; the sheath-
ing of the nerves, which connect different processing centers, is not 
ultimately finished until the early twenties.229 This sheathing also af-
fects the part of the brain that “regulate[s] emotion, judgment, and im-
pulse control.”230 
Impulsivity, a hallmark characteristic of adolescent behavior, has 
been examined quite extensively in recent years. Defined as, “a predis-
position toward rapid, unplanned reactions to internal or external 
stimuli without regard to the negative consequences of these reactions 
to the impulsive individuals or others”231 impulsivity is action with 
“minimal or complete lack of forethought.”232 A recent research study 
published by Laurence Steinberg reports significant age differences in 
planning ahead, time perspective and anticipation of future conse-
quences.233 With this, the impulsivity inherent in adolescents is directly 
related to the moral culpability of a juvenile offender. 
The significance of these physiological and brain science advances 
is quite clear. Adolescents are not comparable to adults in decision-
making capacities because of the developmental differences. Hyper-
responsiveness to stimuli, immaturity in brain development, and the 
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SILVA.FINAL (UPDATED 6.27) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/28/2014 7:21 AM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 28 
448 
lack of a fully developed sheathing process together result in an unde-
veloped youth who is incapable of engaging in the full range of pro-
cesses required in adult type decision-making. This in turn affects 
judgment and criminal blameworthiness. 
The physiological and biological immaturities in the adolescent 
brain do not satisfy traditional notions of criminal culpability inherent 
in the mens rea requirements of criminal offenses including “willful act” 
or “deliberate indifference.” At most, juvenile offenders would be 
“reckless” or “negligent.” That a juvenile has not reached full maturity 
and is acting without optimal executive control should be considered 
not only when making transfer determinations but also in the overall 
sanctioning of youthful offenders. The United States Supreme Court 
has taken such information into account in recent decisions. 
C. United States Supreme Court Precedent 
Over the past decade the Supreme Court has cultivated important 
substantive jurisprudence in the area of adolescent development and 
the distinctions between adolescents and adults.234 The Court has re-
peatedly asserted that a child’s age is “more than a chronological 
fact.”235 Over the years, this principle has evolved into a body of law 
centered on the idea that minors are less mature than adults and are 
more susceptible to outside influences.236 
In the 2005 United States Supreme Court case of Roper v. Sim-
mons,237 the Court was asked to review the constitutionality of the 
death penalty as a sentence meted out to juvenile offenders in homici-
dal cases. Taking center stage was the issue concerning the psychoso-
cial and biological differences between juveniles and adults. Writing 
for the majority, Justice Kennedy embraced the notion that juveniles 
(under the age of eighteen) were categorically less blameworthy than 
 
 234.  J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S.Ct. 2394 (2011); Graham v. Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2011 
(2010); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); John-
son v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 445 U.S. 104 (1982); Bellotti v. Baird, 
442 U.S. 622 (1979) (plurality opinion). 
 235. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 569 (2005); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 445 U.S. 104, 115 (1982). 
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 237.  Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
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adults and thus could not receive the death penalty.238 In its reasoning 
the Court specifically discussed recognized three important differences 
between juveniles and adults. First, the Court recognized the recent 
scientific and psychological studies that to real differences between ju-
veniles and adults.239 Kennedy asserted, 
[A]s any parent knows and as the scientific and sociological studies 
respondent and his amici cite tend to confirm, ‘[a] lack of maturity 
and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth 
more often than in adults and are more understandable among the 
young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered 
actions and decisions.’240 
Second, the Roper Court also recognized that juveniles were more 
susceptible to peer pressure.241 Citing a recent article by Elizabeth 
Scott and Laurence Steinberg, the Court concluded that this vulnera-
bility to outside pressures “is explained in part by the prevailing cir-
cumstances that juveniles have less control, or less experience with 
control, over their own environment.”242 With this, the Court recog-
nizes that minors lack the impulse controls that adults have or ought 
to have. Finally, the Court asserted “that the character of a juvenile is 
not as well formed as that of an adult.”243 For the Court, the factors 
contributing to this immaturity diminishes the moral culpability of the 
juvenile’s conduct.244 Moreover, these very characteristics that make a 
juvenile reckless and impetuous are transient, and as the youth mature 
and grow these characteristics may subside and dissipate.245 Dissenting, 
Justice Scalia’s argument on these points was that the studies “in no 
way justify a constitutional imperative that prevents legislatures and 
juries from treating exceptional cases in an exceptional way.”246 With 
most of the members of the Court finding merit in the psychological 
and brain science studies provided by the respondent and his amici, the 
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Court began the transformation of the treatment of juvenile offenders 
in the American criminal justice system. 
In 2010, Graham v. Florida247 was decided. The issue before the 
Court was whether a juvenile could be constitutionally sentenced to 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a non-homicide 
offense.248 Justice Kennedy, again writing for the majority, cited the 
scientific and psychological research in Roper as well as emerging de-
velopments in the field of neuroscience to invalidate the sentence on 
Eighth Amendment grounds.249 Moreover, the Court cited a number 
of amici that pointed out the biological and psychological developmen-
tal differences of juveniles as data supporting its holding.250 Finding 
merit in the argument that juveniles are more capable of reformation 
and change than adults, the Court decided that courts ought to treat 
juveniles differently than adults in jurisdictions that mete out sentences 
of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole in non-homicidal 
offenses.251 Specifically, Justice Kennedy concluded that juveniles (like 
the appellant) possess a “twice diminished moral culpability.”252 
The Court also cited the research relied on in Roper and Graham 
in its 2011 decision in JDB. v. North Carolina.253 In that case, the Su-
preme Court held that a child’s age was relevant to the “custody” de-
termination as well as the decision to administer Miranda warnings.254 
Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor asserted that “children 
characteristically lack the capacity to exercise mature judgment and 
possess only an incomplete ability to understand the world around 
them.”255 More specifically in the context of police questioning and in-
terrogation, Justice Sotomayor quoted precedent stating, “events that 
‘would leave a man cold and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm 
a lad in his early teens.’”256  
 
 247.  Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
 248.  Id. at 1. 
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 250.  Id. at 22. 
 251.  Id. at 17. 
 252.  Id. at 18. 
 253.  J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011). 
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With this, the Court further entrenched the notion that juveniles 
are different than adults and should be treated as such. This time, the 
Court extended the principle outside the context of punishment and 
applied it to the prophylactic constitutional protections of Miranda. 
The most recent Supreme Court decision recognizing a distinction 
between juveniles and adults occurred in the 2012 case of Miller v. Al-
abama.257 In Miller, the juvenile petitioners were charged and convicted 
of murder and sentenced in accordance to state statute to life impris-
onment without the possibility of parole.258 The Court held that life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for those who commit-
ted crimes when they were under the age of eighteen constituted cruel 
and unusual punishment, thereby violating the Eighth Amendment.259 
Relying heavily on the principles and studies discussed in Roper and 
Graham, the Miller Court insisted that a sentencing court have the 
ability to consider information regarding characteristics inherent in 
adolescent development and the lesser culpability of youths gener-
ally.260 
In the past ten years, the United States Supreme Court has effec-
tively re-shaped our thinking about the treatment of juveniles in our 
system of criminal justice. For the Court, the physiological, psycho-
logical, and biological differences matter. Moreover, this immaturity 
and inability to adequately render decisions convinces the Court that 
juveniles are incapable of forming the mens rea required to be punished 
as adults in the most severe criminal cases. With jurisprudence in this 
area evolving towards treating juveniles differently, state courts are 
forced to take notice and move forward accordingly. 
 
 257.  Miller v. Alabama , 132 S. Ct. 2455 (U.S. 2012). 
 258.  Id. at 2460–63. There were two petitioners in this case. Petitioner Kuntrell Jackson 
was fourteen years old when he was charged with capital felony murder and aggravated robbery 
in Arkansas. The prosecutor directly filed into adult court. Petitioner Jackson moved to transfer 
the case to juvenile court but the trial court denied the motion and the appellate court affirmed. 
Petitioner Miller, fourteen at the time of the alleged crimes, was charged and convicted of murder 
in the course of arson. The prosecutor moved to transfer the case to district court. Miller ap-
pealed. In affirming the district court, the Alabama Court of Appeals cited Miller’s “mental ma-
turity” and his criminal history. 
 259.  Id. at 2469. 
 260.  Id. at 2467. 
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D. Summary 
Scott and Steinberg’s mitigation paradigm serves as a portal for 
legislators to remain faithful to Best Interest ideals. Focusing on a 
lesser culpability, immaturity, and the likelihood for change, Scott and 
Steinberg’s diminished culpability framework provides a platform for 
the development of other legal tools to protect youth from their own 
flawed decision-making. Backed by the sciences and encouraged by 
stare decisis, a mitigation approach to juvenile justice may provide a ba-
sis for the establishment of a legislative safety valve prior to the transfer 
decision and the creation of a partial defense in adult criminal prose-
cutions. 
V. Best Interest of the Child Modified 
Taking into account the contemporary understanding of adoles-
cent development, it is important to ensure that the law and policy 
governing juvenile crime reflect this knowledge. One resolution is to 
allow evidence of a juvenile’s neuro-psychological development to en-
ter into transfer determinations of prosecutors, judges, and legislative 
mandate. By allowing the decision-maker to consider the immaturity 
and mental capacity of the individual offender, courts will be required 
to take a closer look at not only the individual offender but also at the 
information and data on adolescent development. Another method 
that will ensure the presentation of such evidence is to permit juvenile 
offenders prosecuted in adult court to present a partial defense of di-
minished capacity thereby allowing for the possible mitigation of the 
offense in general. This section explores both of these options in detail. 
A. Presumption of Immaturity 
In order to ensure that juvenile justice administration is keeping 
with the foundational ideals of the Best Interest, it is critical to fashion 
a procedure that recognizes both the psychosocial concerns in adoles-
cent development as well as recent United States Supreme Court prec-
edent. The Court has stated that “the State is entitled to adjust its legal 
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system to account for children’s vulnerability.”261 A minor’s suscepti-
bility to outside pressures and peer influence, impulsivity, and a gen-
eral lack of perspective and judgment places a moral imperative on the 
State to consider these factors in evaluating a transfer decision. For the 
Court, “The State has a strong and legitimate interest in the welfare 
of its young citizens, who immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judg-
ment may sometimes impair their ability to exercise their rights 
wisely.”262 Thus, the state must consider it a duty to protect juveniles 
from themselves. 
One way that states may protect its minors is to presume immatu-
rity and work toward a solution or disposition from that point. Recog-
nized in the context of minor abortions, the presumption of immatu-
rity posits that juveniles are not mature enough to decide whether to 
undergo an abortion and therefore parental involvement is legally re-
quired in the decision-making process.263 This principle is easily trans-
ferrable in the context of juvenile justice administration, particularly in 
the context of juvenile transfers to adult court. The idea is that prior 
to an adult criminal prosecution, a juvenile within a specific age range 
(fourteen to seventeen years old) would be presumed immature. This 
presumption of immaturity seeks to protect juveniles from an imbal-
anced administration of justice. The presumption asserts that because 
the juvenile is a certain age, he has not fully developed psychosocially 
and is thereby less blameworthy than an adult. The State, wanting to 
rebut the presumption, must produce evidence showing that the juve-
nile is mature and as blameworthy as an adult. The following section 
discusses presumptions generally, the presumption of immaturity used 
in the abortion context, and the application of this presumption in the 
context of juvenile justice administration. 
1. Presumption of immaturity 
A presumption concerns a legally acknowledged relationship be-
tween facts.264 It is a rule of law and requires that once specific facts are 
established (“basic facts”), the existence of another fact (“presumed 
 
 261.  Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) (quoting plurality opinion). 
 262.  Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444 (1990). 
 263.  Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
 264.  JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 63 (2d ed. 1995). 
SILVA.FINAL (UPDATED 6.27) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/28/2014 7:21 AM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 28 
454 
fact”) must be taken as established unless a certain condition is ful-
filled.265 In an attempt to decipher the operationalization of presump-
tions with the introduction of rebuttal evidence, two separate ap-
proaches have evolved: Thayer’s “bursting bubble” approach and the 
Morgan approach. Under the “bursting bubble” approach a presump-
tion will dissipate when the presumed fact is contradicted by credible 
evidence.266 With this, the opponent of the presumption is required to 
introduce evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding to the pre-
sumption. The opponent only carries the burden of production. The 
Morgan theory requires the judge to instruct the jury that it must find 
fact B if they find fact A, unless the opponent of the presumption per-
suades the jury that the absence of fact B is more probably true than 
not.267 This approach, in effect, places both the burden of production 
and the burden of persuasion on the opponent. 
There are two different types of presumptions in the criminal con-
text: mandatory presumptions and permissive presumptions. Manda-
tory presumptions are either rebuttable or irrebuttable presumptions. 
A mandatory rebuttable presumption requires a finding of the pre-
sumed fact upon proof of the basic fact unless the opposing party re-
buts the presumption. The procedural effect of this type of presump-
tion is to shift the burden of persuasion to the opponent regarding the 
presumed fact once the basic fact is established. This burden shifting 
is constitutionally permissible so long as the presumed fact is not an 
element of a charged offense.268 An irrebuttable mandatory presump-
tion requires that the factfinder find the presumed fact upon proof of 
the basic fact although the opposing party rebuts the presumed fact. 
Irrebuttable mandatory presumptions are rare in criminal law. Permis-
sive presumptions allow the factfinder to find the presumed fact but 
does not require the finding. This is not a burden shifting exercise. 
Instead, the permissive presumption provides a connection between 
the basic fact and the fact at issue thereby giving the factfinder discre-
tion in presuming a fact.269 
 
 265.  EDMUND MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 37 (1961). 
 266.  Id. at 34–35. 
 267.  Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARV. L. REV. 
59, 82–83 (1933). 
 268.  Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). 
 269.  County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979). 
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The United States Supreme Court has stated that the due process 
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments serve as a limit on a 
legislature’s ability to create presumptions.270 In order to pass consti-
tutional muster, there must be a “rational connection” between the 
facts proven and the fact presumed “and the latter is ‘more likely than 
not to flow from’ the former.”271 
Under our decisions, a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if 
there be no rational connection between the fact proved and the ul-
timate fact presumed, if the inference of the one from proof of the 
other is arbitrary because of a lack of a connection between the two 
in common experience. This is not to say that a valid presumption 
may not be created upon a view of relation broader than that a jury 
might take in a specific case. But where the inference is so strained as 
not to have a reasonable relation to the circumstances of life as we 
know them, it is not competent for the legislature to create it as a rule 
governing the procedure of courts.272 
The standard for reviewing presumptions sets a relatively low bar. 
So long as there is a reasonable relation between the basic fact and the 
presumed fact, a presumption ought to pass constitutional scrutiny. 
However, mandatory presumptions are typically disfavored as courts 
perceive them to weaken the strength of the threshold burden of proof 
as well as complicate the assignment of the burden.273 
2. Presumption of immaturity in the courts 
 a. United State Supreme Court and Bellotti. The United States 
Supreme Court has dealt with presumptions in a variety of settings and 
has in fact reviewed the presumption of immaturity, albeit implicitly. 
In Bellotti v. Baird,274 the Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute 
requiring parental consent or parental notification before a minor was 
permitted to have an abortion. The Court determined that in order for 
such regulations to pass constitutional muster, statutes must 
implement procedures permitting minors to bypass parental consent 
 
 270.  Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943). 
 271.  County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 165 (1979). 
 272.  Tot, 319 U.S. at 467–68. 
 273.  Id. 
 274.  Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). 
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and notification.275 This mechanism is known as a “judicial bypass 
provision.”276 Judicial bypass is a procedural mechanism that rests on a 
showing of maturity or a Best Interest evaluation. In the case of 
“maturity,” judicial bypass allows minors to petition the court to rebut 
the presumption of immaturity by showing that they have the 
capability to make an informed abortion decision. Judicial bypass also 
serves as protection for incompetent minors from immature decision-
making.277 A finding of sufficient maturity permits the judge to waive 
parental involvement. A finding of immaturity may still permit the 
judge to waive parental involvement so long as the judge believes it 
would be in the minor’s best interest. 
In discussing its concern for the vulnerability of minors, the Bellotti 
Court asserted that “during the formative years of childhood and ado-
lescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment 
to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them.”278 
For the plurality, Justice Powell cited First Amendment jurisprudence 
for support including Ginsberg v. New York279 and Prince v. Massachu-
setts,280 both cases where the Court, concerned with the immaturity of 
a minor’s decision making, upheld state restrictions on a minor’s free-
dom. For the Court “immature minors often lack the ability to make 
fully informed choices that take account of both the immediate and 
long range consequences.”281 Justice Powell also discussed three rea-
sons why the constitutional rights of children are not the equivalent of 
those of adults: “. . . the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inabil-
ity to make critical decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the 
importance of the parental role in child rearing.”282 This is manifested 
in the a number of different contexts such as voting, service in the mil-
itary, purchasing alcohol and tobacco, entering contracts, etc. 
 
 275.  Id. at 643–44. 
 276.  Id. at 651. 
 277.  Satsie Veith, The Judicial Bypass Procedure and Adolescents’ Abortion Rights: The Fallacy 
of the Maturity Standard, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 453 (1994). 
 278.  Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635. 
 279.  Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). The Court upheld a New York statute 
that restricted the sale to children under the age of seventeen of sexually oriented magazines. 
 280.  Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). The Court upheld a Massachusetts 
child-labor statute that prohibited children from selling religious literature on a public street. 
 281.  Bellotti, 443 U.S at 640. 
 282.  Id. at 634. 
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The United States Supreme Court has not overtly defined “ma-
turity.” The Court has discussed the term and the concept in a number 
of different contexts, but has yet to define the term or announce factors 
to be considered in making a “maturity” assessment. It came closest to 
announcing a principle in Bellotti, when Justice Powell remarked that 
“immature minors often lack the ability to make fully informed choices 
that account of both immediate and long range consequences. . . .”283 
For the plurality, immaturity denotes an inability to evaluate choices 
in both the short and long term. Moreover, immature minors are in-
capable of making informed decisions. Most important, the Court im-
plicitly recognizes that immaturity is an intrinsic characteristic of mi-
nors. Lower courts have used this principle to shape factors that could 
be considered in making a maturity assessment. 
 b. Lower Courts. Lower courts have used the dicta in Bellotti to 
fashion standards and rules governing maturity determinations. In 
H.B. v. Wilkinson,284 District Court Judge Thomas Greene utilized the 
principle announced in Bellotti to construct a framework to which 
“maturity” may be analyzed by courts. The district court dismissed a 
pregnant minor’s lawsuit seeking to prevent a physician from notifying 
her parents of the minor’s decision to seek an abortion.285 In essence, 
she challenged the Utah Statute requiring notification to an immature 
minor’s parents of the minor’s consideration of abortion.286 In order to 
assess the minor’s “maturity,” the district court reviewed the 
importance of “experience, perspective, and judgment.”287 
In evaluating a minor’s “experience,” the district court noted that 
“work experience, experience in living away from home, and handling 
personal finances” could be important to consider.288 “Perspective” is 
assessed with evidence demonstrating a minor’s appreciation for the 
 
 283.  Id. at 640. 
 284.  639 F. Supp. 952 (1986). 
 285.  Id. 
 286.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304(2) (1953). 
To enable the physician to exercise his best medical judgment, he shall: 
(3) [N]otify, if possible, the parents upon whom the abortion is to be performed, 
if she is a minor. . . This statute was construed by the Utah Supreme Court as 
mandating notice where possible to the parents of minors seeking an abortion. 
Id. 
 287.  H.B., 639 F. Supp. at 954. 
 288.  Id. 
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gravity of her options (in the case of abortion).289 Moreover, the district 
court called for an examination of the minor’s ability to consider short 
term and long term consequences as well as a realistic perception of 
the circumstances.290 “Judgment” questions the minor’s ability to be 
“fully informed so as to be able to weigh alternatives independently 
and realistically.”291 This characteristic also considers the minor’s con-
duct including ignorance of assessing options and stress.292 
In H.B. the district court’s finding of facts considered both facts 
specific to the case as well as facts that may be considered general to 
all minors.293 The minor’s marital status, age, whether emancipated, 
whether the minor lived at home with her parents, employment status 
and history, educational performance and status, and history, familial 
history, facts and circumstances surrounding the pregnancy and deci-
sion to abort, persons the minor consulted, and results from a variety 
of examinations including I.Q.294 
State courts have also employed a similar analysis. Florida enacted 
a statute that requires a minor to prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence that she is “sufficiently mature to decide whether to terminate 
her pregnancy.”295 The court is required to “hear evidence relating to 
the emotional development, maturity, intellect, and understanding of 
the minor, and all relevant evidence.”296 Florida courts consider a vari-
ety of factors in assessing maturity. Such factors include the minor’s 
physical age, work experience, proclivity to seek counsel and support 
from a trusted adult, awareness of her options other than abortion, em-
ployment status and history, educational performance and status, and 
life plans.297 The court is thereafter required to issue a written order 
with specific findings of fact and conclusions of law that support its 
 
 289.  Id. 
 290.  Id. 
 291.  Id. 
 292.  Id. 
 293.  Id. at 955–58. 
 294.  Id. 
 295.  FLA. STAT. § 390.01114(4)(c) (2006). 
 296.  Id. 
 297.  In re Doe, 967 So.2d 1017, 1019 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); In re Doe, 924 So.2d 935, 
939 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006); In re Doe, 932 So.2d 278, 284 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). 
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decision.298 State courts across the country examine the “maturity” of 
a minor in much the same way.299 
3. Presumption of immaturity in juvenile transfer decisions. 
Juvenile transfer decisions are inconsistent with the common un-
derstanding and status of children in the legal domain. Statutory ex-
clusions and automatic transfers presume maturity and permit the state 
to circumvent requirements set out in Kent guaranteeing a hearing 
prior to transfer as well as the assistance of counsel. Statutory exclusion 
and direct file expose juveniles to adult criminal prosecution without 
assessing common characteristics that most other courts evaluate prior 
to any adjudication involving a minor. Such characteristics include 
criminal history, but also psychosocial maturity and social history.300 
Indeed, juvenile courts were created because of society’s assumption 
that juveniles may be treated constitutionally distinct from adults.301 
This recognition lies in the understanding that this different treatment 
is permissible because of a juvenile’s lack of maturity. 
The presumption of immaturity is a principle in juvenile law that 
transcends its substantive progeny. In cases where a juvenile is to be 
transferred to adult court for criminal prosecution, there should be 
prophylactic protecting of juveniles from entering the adult system 
where it is all but guaranteed that the juvenile will recidivate and be-
come an adult criminal offender. The principle undergirding the pre-
sumption of immaturity used in juvenile transfer decisions is the same 
as was announced in Bellotti v. Baird: minors are incapable of making 
reasoned decisions. 
The presumption of immaturity may be established by statute, es-
pecially in direct file and statutory exclusion jurisdictions. Such a pre-
sumption ought to be a rebuttable mandatory presumption. This 
 
 298.  Id. 
 299.  In re Anonymous, 8 So.3d 1004, 1005–06 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) (assessing a minor’s 
maturity and considering employment status and minor’s lack of consultation with a trusted 
adult); In re Doe, 2008 WL 4681847, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008) (reviewing lower courts maturity 
determination and contemplating minor’s age, work status, and educational performance). 
 300.  Robert O. Dawson, Judicial Waiver Theory and Practice, in CHANGING BORDERS OF 
JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT (Jeffrey Fagan 
& Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000). 
 301. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635. 
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would require the court to presume that a minor is immature and less 
blameworthy upon a showing that the juvenile-defendant is under the 
age of eighteen. This requires that courts begin the criminal adjudica-
tion of a minor with the understanding that juvenile court is the proper 
forum because the juvenile is less blameworthy. 
The prosecution would have to rebut the presumption by produc-
ing evidence tending to show the juvenile’s maturity, and therefore he 
or she should be considered as criminally blameworthy as an adult. 
Such evidence that may be presented to establish maturity is informed 
by the minor abortion line of cases. This evidence would include 
whether the juvenile was emancipated, whether the juvenile has ever 
been adjudged “mature” in a previous legal proceeding, the juvenile’s 
mental health status, I.Q., familial status, social service history, finan-
cial dependency, and criminal history. Experts should be called to at-
test to the psychosocial developmental characteristics of a juvenile gen-
erally, as well as the “maturity” level of the individual specifically. 
Furthermore, because the State has the burden of proof and persuasion 
in a criminal case, the Morgan theory of presumptions is the best fit. 
With this, the prosecutor will hold both the burden of production and 
persuasion. Moreover, the establishment of maturity ought to be made 
by clear and convincing evidence. This threshold inquiry will ensure 
that the review of the evidence is more probing, guaranteeing greater 
attention to the juvenile-defendants profile and characteristic tenden-
cies. If the prosecutor meets her burden, the judge may determine that 
transfer is appropriate. However, if the prosecutor fails to show that 
the juvenile is “mature,” the case will be adjudicated in juvenile court. 
B. Diminished Capacity as a Defense 
While the doctrine of diminished capacity is not the most well set-
tled area of law, it does allow room for interpretation. There is no 
standard definition of diminished capacity.302 Many scholars and com-
mentators consider the notion that diminished capacity as a defense is 
a “legal colloquialism.”303 Instead, most consider diminished capacity 
 
 302. HENRY F. FRADELLA, FROM INSANITY TO DIMINISHED CAPACITY: MENTAL 
ILLNESS AND CRIMINAL EXCUSE IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW 59 (2007). 
 303.  Dressler, supra note 264, at 368 (quoting State v. Humanik, 489 A.2d 691, 697 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985)). 
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as an evidence doctrine.304 In a criminal trial, a defendant introduces 
evidence for the purpose of demonstrating that he or she did not have 
the requisite intent required to be convicted of the charged offense. If 
the State has not adequately proven to the trier of fact that the defend-
ant possessed the requisite mens rea element, the defendant is entitled 
to acquittal or mitigation of the original offense to a lesser included 
offense. The problems associated with invoking the doctrine are typi-
cally evidentiary as certain evidence is not admissible if the defendant 
failed to plead not guilty by reason of insanity. In using the mitigation 
model of juvenile justice and guided by Best Interest ideals, an argu-
ment can be made that diminished capacity may be used as a defense 
in adult criminal prosecutions of juveniles. 
Scott and Steinberg’s mitigation framework specifically examining 
the diminished capacity of adolescents may be used to demonstrate the 
way in which the defense may be utilized as a defense by a juvenile at 
trial in adult court. This would allow for mitigation of the original of-
fense based on evidence presented to a jury regarding psychosocial and 
biological distinctions between juveniles and adults as well as evidence 
related to the “maturity” of the juvenile-defendant. Such testimony 
would be used to answer the “question of whether the defendant in fact 
possessed a particular mental state of the charged offense.”305 How-
ever, it is important to understand the context and complexities of di-
minished capacity in order to fully comprehend the manner in which 
the defense could possibly work. 
It is important to note that a debate is forging ahead regarding the 
“capacity” of juveniles. Scott and Steinberg argue that adolescents pos-
sess a diminished capacity due to immaturity and impulsivity.306 For 
them, “youthful choices may share much in common with those of 
adults whose decision-making capacities are impaired by emotional 
disturbance . . . or failure to understand fully the consequences of their 
acts.”307 With this, Scott and Steinberg work within the parameters of 
traditional criminal law and established criminal defenses. Professor 
Jennifer Drobac challenges this framework by arguing that adolescents 
 
 304. Id.; FRADELLA, supra note 302, at 59–60. 
 305.  United States v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 896 (3d Cir. 1987). 
 306.  Scott & Steinberg, supra note 4, at 830. 
 307. Id. 
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do not in fact possess a diminished capacity.308 Instead, she asserts that 
adolescents have a “developing capacity” because they are still devel-
oping and maturing into adults.309 Drobac’s formulation of adolescent 
capacity captures the lesser criminal blameworthiness of adolescents 
that Scott and Steinberg recognize while simultaneously rejecting the 
traditional criminal law understanding of lesser capacity as a defense. 
While there is a great deal of merit in Drobac’s capacity framework, 
for present purposes it is important to stay within the parameters of 
the traditional criminal prosecution in adult court and within the con-
fines of already recognized criminal law defenses. 
1. Diminished capacity generally 
Diminished capacity typically refers to two classes of situations in 
which an individual’s atypical mental state will either exonerate her or 
result in a conviction of a lesser included offense than was originally 
charged.310 For purposes of this article, only the second category will 
be discussed. The understanding of diminished capacity in the second 
application mitigates or “partially excuses” the offenders guilt even if 
she possessed the requisite mens rea to commit the crime.311 With this, 
the defense of “partial responsibility” works in a practical sense similar 
to an evidentiary rule.312 The goal of the defense is to have such evi-
dence admitted to demonstrate to the trier of fact that although the 
offender possessed the intent to commit the crime, she is only partially 
responsible because she is a juvenile. Such evidence would most likely 
be in the form of experts in the area of neuro-science and psychosocial 
studies, mental health experts, counselors, and the like. While such de-
fenses have been used in American courts, only a few states permit the 
defense.313 
American jurisdictions are divided over what type of evidence con-
cerning mental abnormality should be admissible for the purpose of 
 
 308.  Jennifer Ann Drobac, Sex and The Workplace: “Consenting” Adolescents and a Conflict of 
Laws, 79 WASH. L. REV. 471, 519 (2004). 
 309. Id. 
 310.  Dressler, supra note 264, at 367. 
 311. Id. at 368. 
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mitigating mens rea outside of the insanity defense. Some jurisdictions 
only allow such evidence in murder prosecutions.314 These jurisdic-
tions will allow the introduction of mens rea evidence related to insan-
ity but will not admit it to show that a defendant lacked the capacity to 
form the requisite intent to be convicted of the crime charged.315 Oth-
ers that follow the Model Penal Code permit such evidence so long as 
it goes to the complete negation of the mens rea element.316 Finally, 
some states permit the defense in the case of specific intent offenses.317 
If the defense is permissible, it is generally only used in the context of 
homicide—reducing murder to manslaughter. 
2. Clark v. Arizona 
The United States Supreme Court recently considered a question 
on this matter. In Clark v. Arizona,318 the Court considered whether it 
was constitutionally permissible to prohibit expert mental health evi-
dence to disprove a mens rea element of the charged offense.319 In its 
opinion, the Court differentiated between three types of mens rea evi-
dence: observational, mental disease, and capacity evidence.320 Obser-
vational evidence is testimony from witnesses who can describe a de-
fendant’s actions and words.321 It can also include testimony from an 
expert on a defendant’s penchant to think or behave a certain way.322 
Mental disease evidence concerns a diagnosis of the defendant with 
testimony concerning related characteristics of the diagnosed dis-
ease.323 Capacity evidence is testimony from an expert regarding the 
defendant’s capacity to form the requisite intent necessary to be con-
victed of the charged offense.324 The law in Arizona permitted the de-
 
 314. Id. at 370. 
 315. Id. at 371. 
 316. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02 (2012). 
 317.  Dressler, supra note 264, at 370. 
 318. 126 S. Ct. 2709, 2737 (2006). 
 319. Id. at 2724–25. 
 320. Id. at 2724. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. at 2725. 
 323. Id. at 2717–18. 
 324. Id. at 2725. 
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fendant to introduce observational evidence but prohibited mental dis-
ease and capacity evidence from being admitted.325 The Court con-
cluded that Arizona was within its constitutional right to do so.326 The 
majority asserted that the state has the right to presume that people 
are sane and it was permissible for Arizona to place the burden of per-
suasion on the defendant to prove insanity as a defense.327 The Court 
reasoned that allowing the introduction of evidence which would cre-
ate doubt on mens rea would in effect permit the defendant to rebut the 
presumption of sanity.328 With this, the Supreme Court upheld a 
State’s right to restrict mental disease and capacity evidence in adult 
criminal prosecutions.329 
3. Application 
While it is clear that most American jurisdictions hesitate in per-
mitting diminished capacity as a defense or severely restrict capacity 
evidence, diminished capacity may work in adult prosecutions of juve-
niles. It may work as a special defense for juveniles, thereby allowing 
the introduction of evidence of a juvenile’s “immaturity” and if rele-
vant, a juvenile’s emotional or cognitive disabilities. Such evidence that 
may be introduced would relate to the same factors discussed in Sec-
tion A regarding the presumption of immaturity, including whether 
the juvenile has ever been adjudged “mature” in a previous legal pro-
ceeding, the juvenile’s mental health status, I.Q., familial status, social 
service history, financial dependency, and criminal history. Experts 
may be called to testify regarding the general psychosocial develop-
mental characteristics of juveniles as well as the “maturity” level of the 
individual specifically. 
Prior to the introduction of evidence of diminished capacity, a de-
fendant would have to meet her burden of production by providing 
sufficient evidence of “immaturity,” or in the case of children with dis-
abilities, enough evidence of mental disease that would interfere with 
 
 325. Id. 
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the defendant’s ability to develop the requisite mens rea. Once the de-
fendant meets this burden, the defendant’s trial witnesses will testify 
that defendant’s capacity to develop the required intent was “dimin-
ished” at the time the crime occurred. This would include the intro-
duction of mental health professionals including psychologists, psychi-
atrists, counselors, social workers, and the like. If the fact-finder finds 
the juvenile immature then it may find that the juvenile had diminished 
capacity and therefore incapable of forming the requisite intent to 
commit the charged offense. However, the jury may only partially ex-
cuse the juvenile-defendant and mitigate the charged offense to a lesser 
included offense. 
Different courts have permitted the admissibility of a variety of ev-
idence to support a defendant’s diminished capacity claim. For exam-
ple, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that evidence con-
cerning volitional impairment (impulse control) is evidence of 
diminished capacity.330 Thus, it is likely that the court will allow evi-
dence of the juvenile’s adolescent development and psychosocial sta-
tus. Such testimony would present the fact-finder with evidence of a 
“normal” adolescent response versus the response of the defendant. 
Permitting such evidence related to a juvenile’s capacity to form the 
requisite mens rea would recognize the very real difference between a 
juvenile and an adult. The fact-finder would ultimately decide if the 
defendant acted as a juvenile or an adult. 
With the criticism and uncertainty surrounding diminished capac-
ity as a defense, it may be difficult to persuade legislators to permit the 
use of capacity evidence in adult prosecutions of youth. However, if 
Best Interest considerations are the foundation of the juvenile justice, 
allowing this defense appears to be an appropriate compromise be-
tween those who wish to prosecute juveniles as adults and those who 
desire juveniles to be treated differently than adults. Legislators may 
also want to consider extending this defense to crimes other than hom-
icide in those prosecutions concerning juveniles. 
 
 330.  United States v. McBroom, 124 F.3d 533, 47–48 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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C. Extreme Mental or Emotional Disturbance 
The Model Penal Code (“MPC”) approach to partial responsibil-
ity in the context of homicide provides guidance on the way in which 
neuroscience and psychosocial evidence could be used to mitigate a 
juvenile’s criminal responsibility. The mitigating defense of “extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance” (“EMED”) permits a defendant to 
utilize this defense to mitigate a charge of murder to manslaughter 
generally. Some states that have adopted this formulation of homicide, 
such as New York, permit the state to charge manslaughter committed 
with EMED,331 as well as use EMED as an affirmative defense.332 In 
this section, the use of EMED as a defense in adult prosecutions of 
juveniles is explored. 
1. EMED generally 
Under the Model Penal Code, a homicide that is committed as the 
product of “extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there 
is a reasonable explanation” constitutes manslaughter as opposed to 
murder.333 The EMED defense has two main components: 1) it codi-
fies the common law “sudden heat of passion” principle and 2) it allows 
courts to consider partial responsibility as a defense.334 The standard of “rea-
sonableness” for the actor’s conduct is “determined from the viewpoint 
of a person in the actor’s situation under the circumstances as he be-
lieves them to be.”335 The American Law Institute explained the oper-
ation of partial responsibility as, 
[L]ook[ing] into the actor’s mind to see whether he should be judged 
by a lesser standard than that applicable to ordinary men. It recog-
nizes the defendant’s own mental disorder or emotional instability as 
a basis for partially excusing his conduct . . . To the extent that the 
abnormal individual is judged as if he were normal, to the extent that 
the drunk man is judged as if he were sober, to the extent, in short, 
 
 331.  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20 (McKinney 2009). 
 332.  N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27(2)(a) (McKinney 2009). 
 333. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (2012). 
 334.  Dressler, supra note 264, at 375. 
 335. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (2012). 
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that the defective person is judged as if he were someone else, the 
moral judgment of the victim is undermined.336 
By specifically recognizing partial responsibility as a defense, the 
American Law Institute explicitly recognized individual character de-
fects to be taken into consideration even if just partially. To ignore 
such deficiencies is to undermine the normative judgment of the court 
and community. 
2. Application 
In trying juveniles as adults, certainly the courts could consider the 
psychosocial and emotional infirmities ever present in adolescent de-
velopment. While EMED is traditionally used only in the context of 
homicide, this is not to say that the reasonableness standard could not 
be transported to a variety of cases that involve a juvenile transferred 
to adult court. By using both a subjective and objective standard, the 
trier of fact would be permitted to consider the frailties inherent in 
adolescents, including immaturity and the characteristics associated 
with this, when determining the more specific issue of “whether there 
is a reasonable explanation or excuse for the defendant’s EMED that 
caused him to take a life.” Therefore, if the trier of fact finds that there 
was a reasonable explanation for the juvenile-defendant’s emotional 
disturbance, based on D’s psychological characteristics that caused him 
to commit the crime then the juvenile-defendant is convicted of a 
lesser charge.337 By taking into consideration psychosocial factors, fact-
finders are permitted to adjudicate the offense with the youth’s psy-
chosocial and biological characteristics in mind. Using this formula-
tion to evaluate reasonableness when juveniles are tried in adult court 
will allow juries to take into consideration characteristics specific to 
juveniles while simultaneously maintaining the “ordinary person” 
standard. 
 
 
 336.  Id. § 210.3, cmt. at 71–72. 
 337.  Dressler, supra note 264, at 376. 
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3. Limitations 
Professor Stephen Morse once called for the abolition of the de-
fense. At the time, Morse posited that society did not impose upon 
individuals high moral standards.338 All it requires is that we do not 
commit serious offenses.339 Even considering mental health infirmities, 
Morse would not consider “differences in background, mental or emo-
tional condition, or other factors often thought to necessitate mitiga-
tion.”340 Morse’s premise presumes that it is relatively easy not to break 
the law. However, it is harder for some than others especially when 
considering recent research on policing practices, poverty, and race.341 
Thus, Morse’s principle fails to take into account the realities of crim-
inal investigation and criminal prosecution. Professor Morse now 
“proposes that the criminal law . . . include a generic, doctrinal miti-
gating excuse of partial responsibility that would apply to all 
crimes . . . .”342 
Many have also argued that the partial responsibility is a double-
edged sword. While the defense serves to mitigate the criminal blame-
worthiness of the defendant by permitting consideration of mental ab-
normality, it is this defect that exacerbates his dangerousness.343 This 
argument may be meritorious in the context of adult dangerous of-
fenders, but it is less salient when applied to juvenile offenders. The 
“Best Interest of the Child” standard considers the youth offender 
amenable to reform as she is malleable and still developing both bio-
logically and psychosocially. 
 
 
 
 
 
 338.  Stephen Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 30 (1984). 
 339. Id. 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. 
 342.  Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 289, 289 (2003). 
 343.  Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two 
Children of a Dooned Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827, 857 (1977). 
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VI. Conclusion 
The Best Interest ideals of the late nineteenth century carry with 
them lessons and principles that are applicable today and may be fur-
ther utilized in the adult criminal prosecution of juveniles. Under-
standing that juveniles are capable of change and are inherently differ-
ent than adults is the first step to creating appropriate safeguards for 
juveniles as well as society. This paper is not meant to argue that juve-
niles should not be punished for their crimes. Instead, the objective of 
this article is to recognize differences between juveniles and adults so 
as to craft statutory protections in transfer decisions as well as begin to 
think about the way in which traditional criminal law defenses may be 
utilized during the trial of a juvenile adjudicated in adult court. 
The presumption of immaturity, diminished capacity, and EMED 
are presently used by hundreds of courts and attorneys in the United 
States on a day to day basis. These legal tools are not without limitation 
and critique. The presumption of immaturity is thought to be open to 
too much subjectivity and discretion. Moreover, the “maturity” char-
acteristic in one juvenile may be different in another. There is no uni-
form methodology to measure “maturity.” Diminished capacity is not 
the most popular defense to be used in a criminal trial and appears to 
be losing much of its luster in the way of Clark. EMED, currently only 
used in homicide cases, is unlikely to be extended to a defense for ju-
veniles in adult criminal court. Nevertheless, these ideas promote mit-
igation and recognize the difference between juveniles and adults. 
More importantly, these legal tools permit a fact-finder to consider the 
inherent distinctions between the two groups at the most critical point 
in one’s life: criminal proceedings where the deprivation of liberty is a 
real risk. 
This article advocates for the resurrection of Best Interest ideals in 
today’s juvenile justice system. New theories and ideas are developing 
every day in this arena. However, Best Interest remains the strongest 
principle in the administration of juvenile justice and juvenile law gen-
erally. It is the bedrock principle of the juvenile court system and is 
still recognized in the new millennium. Instead of abandoning Best In-
terest and promoting retribution, legislators need realize the scientific 
distinctions and the Supreme Court adoption of the differences be-
tween juvenile criminal responsibility and adult blameworthiness. This 
SILVA.FINAL (UPDATED 6.27) (DO NOT DELETE) 6/28/2014 7:21 AM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 28 
470 
should serve as a catalyst to overhaul retributivist juvenile systems in 
America. In the meantime, advocates and practitioners ought to con-
sider creative ways to interject Best Interest through mitigation type 
vehicles. 
 
 
 
 
